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UNDUE INFLUENCE, INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE AND
BRAINWASHING: A MORE CONSISTENT,
INTERESTS-BASED APPROACH
I. INTRODUCTION
A "psychotherapeutic community" located in New York City's Up-
per West Side believes that "parent-child bonds... are the root of all evil
and the mainspring of psychological maladjustment." ' Accordingly,
parents who are excessively demonstrative towards their children may
have their babies taken from them for foster parenting or adoption by
other members of the group.2 Thereafter, parents' subsequent contact
with their children may be limited to closely supervised visits where the
parents may see the child but physical contact is forbidden.3 Would any
parent, absent the "psychotherapeutic community's" influence, ever con-
sent to such an arrangement?
Two mentally retarded men are found laboring on a farm in poor
health, in squalid conditions and isolated from the rest of society.4 At
trial, the evidence shows that the two men worked "seven days a week,
often 17 hours a day, at first for 15 dollars per week and eventually for no
pay."5 One of the men had lived and worked on the farm for sixteen
years; the other victim had been there more than ten years.6
The use of coercion 7 and persuasion8 to influence another for a spe-
cific purpose is prevalent in our society. Coercive persuasion occurs
when one is persuaded to do something that, but for the influence or
coercion, one would not have chosen to do.' In effect, when one is "per-
1. Randy F. Kandel, Litigating the Cult-Related Child Custody Case, 5 CULTIC STUD. J.,
no. 1, at 122, 123 (1988).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 934 (1988).
5. Id. at 935.
6. Id.
7. Coercion is the act of "compel[ling] by force, intimidation, or authority, especially
without regard for individual desire or volition," or the act of "dominat[ing] or control[ling],
especially by exploiting fear [or] anxiety." RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE 286 (1979).
8. Persuasion is the act of "prevail[ing] on (a person) to do something, as by advising [or]
urging." Id. at 1076.
9. Richard Delgado, Religious Totalism: Gentle and Ungentle Persuasion Under the First
Amendment, 51 S. CAL. L. REv. 1, 5-6 (1977) [hereinafter Delgado, Religious Totalism].
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suaded" to do something, his or her will is overcome by the persuasion as
to that particular act.
In its most innocent guises, coercion is used in such areas as adver-
tising,' 0 self-help groups 1 and the armed forces. 2 In these areas, the
harm of coercion, resulting from behavior that is not motivated by one's
own will, appears to be minimal-one's will is overcome only slightly by
the influence. 3 In still other areas, a person's loss of autonomy may be
outweighed by the social or individual benefits derived from the use of
coercion.14
However, in other areas, the "loss of will" is neither minimal nor
beneficial to society or to the coerced individual; in these situations, co-
ercion takes on a much more sinister cast. The two main kinds of coer-
cion that offend a sense of fairness and autonomy are short-term physical
duress and long-term coercive persuasion (L-TCP).'5 Short-term physi-
cal duress occurs when an individual is compelled to do an act as the
result of a threat of physical harm to self or to others. 6 This Comment
addresses only L-TCP.
L-TCP can be defined as a (1) long-term pattern of influence or con-
trol by (2) a stronger personality or presence that purports to care about
the best interests of (3) an emotionally or mentally more vulnerable per-
1O. Id. at 8.
11. See United States v. Fishman, 743 F. Supp. 713, 717 (N.D. Cal, 1990).
12. Id.
13. For example, one may be convinced as a result of a television commercial to try a new
brand of toothpaste. If one originally preferred another type of toothpaste, perhaps one's will
may be overcome to the point where he or she becomes willing to try the new toothpaste.
Nonetheless, it would be difficult to find this type of influence harmful.
14. There are social benefits, for example, in convincing armed forces' recruits to adhere to
a rigid, military discipline. Although the discipline overcomes the recruit's will, the social
utility of a disciplined, unified armed force arguably outweighs any individual loss of will suf-
fered by the recruit. See Sanford M. Dornbusch, The Military Academy as an Assimilating
Institution, 33 Soc. FORCEs 316, 317-19 (1955).
Similarly, a self-help group such as Alcoholics Anonymous may convince an individual
with an overwhelming desire to drink that he or she cannot control his or her drinking, that
the person thus should abstain totally from alcohol, and that the only way to do so is by
following the Alcoholics Anonymous program. Here, the group may use coercion to over-
come the will of the individual to drink; nonetheless, by submitting to the will of the group, the
alcoholic is benefitted.
15. This Comment uses "long-term coercive persuasion" (L-TCP) as a term of art to dis-
tinguish this type of influence from short-term physical duress. The specific characteristics of
L-TCP are defined infra note 17 and accompanying text.
16. Duress subjects a "person to improper pressure which overcomes his will and coerces
him to comply with [a] demand to which he would not yield if acting as [a] free agent."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 504 (6th ed. 1990). Duress can also be a defense to criminal
conduct. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AusTIN W. ScoTr, JR., CRIMINAL LAW § 5.3, at 432
(2d ed. 1986). See infra note 347 for a description of this criminal defense.
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sonality (4) where the stronger presence actually exploits its position to
further its own interests (5) causing harm to the more vulnerable
personality.
1 7
This Comment focuses on three legal theories that share these char-
acteristics of L-TCP. Undue influence, the first type of coercive persua-
sion analyzed, occurs when a person who is in a position of trust
persuades a donor to confer a pecuniary benefit upon him or her.18
Under the second type of coercive persuasion, involuntary servitude, one
person subjects another to service without compensation. 9 Brain-
washing20 by a religious cult21 is the final type of coercion discussed. 2
17. This definition of long-term coercive persuasion has been developed to describe those
situations where one's will is systematically eroded by the concentrated influence of a stronger
personality over a period of time. See generally ROBERT J. LIFTON, THOUGHT REFORM AND
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TOTALISM 8-15 (1961) (describing indoctrination process designed to
induce subject to abandon existing political, religious or social belief in favor of system im-
posed by indoctrinator); Richard Delgado, Ascription of Criminal States of Mind: Toward a
Defense Theory for the Coercively Persuaded ("Brainwashed") Defendant, 63 MINN. L. REV. 1,
2-3 (1978) [hereinafter Delgado, Criminal States of Mind] (describing various methods and
systematic method used to bring about "behavorial compliance and attitudinal change"). In
these situations, unlike physical duress, one's will is not overcome by an immediate threat of
physical violence, which induces the victim of the influence to do a specific act or series of acts.
See supra note 16 and infra note 347 and accompanying text for a definition of physical duress.
18. See infra notes 59-95 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 96-135 and accompanying text.
20. Brainwashing is "the forcible application of prolonged and intensive indoctrination to
... induce someone to give up basic political, social, or religious beliefs and attitudes and to
accept contrasting regimented ideas." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTION-
ARY 267 (1986). The specific methods of indoctrination vary, but the basic theory is that
brainwashing or coercive persuasion:
[I]s fostered through the creation of a controlled environment that heightens the
susceptibility of a subject to suggestion and manipulation through sensory depriva-
tion, physiological depletion, cognitive dissonance, peer pressure, and a clear asser-
tion of authority and dominion. The aftermath of indoctrination is a severe
impairment of autonomy and [of] the ability to think independently, which induces a
subject's unyielding compliance and the rupture of past connections, affliations and
associations.
Peterson v. Sorlien, 299 N.W.2d 123, 126 (Minn. 1980), cert denied, 450 U.S. 1031 (1981).
Many authorities assert that brainwashing exists and has remarkable effects. See, e.g.,
LIPrON, supra note 17, at 3-7; EDGAR H. SCHEIN, COERCIVE PERSUASION 15-19 (1961).
Some commentators conclude that certain religious groups use brainwashing techniques to
recruit and control members. See, eg., RONALD ENROTH, YOUTH, BRAINWASHING, AND
THE EXTREMIST CULTS 158-61 (1977); A. JAMES RUDIN & MARCIA R. RUDIN, PRISON OR
PARADISE? THE NEW RELIGIOUS CULTS 20-26 (1980); Delgado, Religious Totalism, supra
note 9, at 3-9. Courts have recognized the existence of brainwashing in religious settings. See
Peterson, 299 N.W.2d at 126; Meroni v. Holy Spirit Ass'n for Unification, 480 N.Y.S.2d 706
(Sup. Ct. 1984), rev'd, 506 N.Y.S.2d 174 (App. Div. 1986), appeal dismissed, 504 N.E.2d 698
(N.Y. 1987). Other authorities, however, believe that brainwashing does not exist at all. See
Lee Coleman, New Religions and the Myth of Mind Control, AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 322,
323 (1984).
Furthermore, the use of the term "brainwashing" is controverted. See, eg., STEVE
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Brainwashing differs from the other types of coercive persuasion because
the harm stems from both the results and the process of brainwashing
itself.23 The brainwashing victim often appears to have completely sur-
HASSAN, COMBATTING CULT MIND CONTROL 55-56 (1988) (contrasting term "brain-
washing" which typically involves abusive treatment with "mind control," which typically
involves more sophisticated, deceptive methods of changing another's will); LIFroN, supra
note 17, at 4-5 (proposing use of "thought reform" to describe "brainwashing" process);
SCHEIN, supra, at 18 (advocating use of term "coercive persuasion" to describe Korean prison-
ers'-of-war experience).
Notwithstanding any controversy that there may be among psychologists as to the exist-
ence or terminology of brainwashing, plaintiffs in many published cases have asserted claims
against religious cults for coercive persuasion. See infra notes 170-274 and accompanying text.
Some plaintiffs have even recovered damages from religious organizations based on brain-
washing facts. See, eg., Molko v. Holy Spirit Ass'n for Unification, 46 Cal. 3d 1092, 762 P.2d
46, 252 Cal. Rptr. 122 (1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1084 (1989). This Comment does not seek
to enter the brainwashing/no-such-thing-as-brainwashing debate but merely to clarify the
standards used in L-TCP.
21. A cult is traditionally viewed as religious in nature. For example, one dictionary de-
fines a cult as "a particular system of religious worship with great devotion to or veneration of
its rites and ceremonies." RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY 353 (1979). However, cults are
often completely secular. One commentator has defined four types of cults: (1) religious cults;
(2) political cults; (3) psychotherapy cults; and (4) commercial cults. HASSAN, supra note 20,
at 39-41. This Comment particularly addresses L-TCP practiced by religious cults. The anal-
ysis of L-TCP used by religious cults and the proposed legal remedy for religious cults, none-
theless, could also be applied to the three other types of cults.
22. Brainwashing can occur in contexts other than religious cults, such as prisoners-of-war
and criminal defendants. See, eg., United States v. Fishman, 743 F. Supp. 713, 717 (N.D. Cal.
1990) (mail fraud defendant raised brainwashing defense); United States v. Hearst, 412 F.
Supp. 889, 890-91 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (bank robbery defendant raised defense); United States v.
Olson, 20 C.M.R. 461, 462 (1955) (brainwashing as defense to charge of collaborating with
enemy); United States v. Batchelor, 19 C.M.R. 452, 464 (1955) (same); United States v. Flem-
ing, 19 C.M.R. 438, 440 (1955) (same); see also VINCENT BUGLIOSI & CHARLES GENTRY,
HELTER SKELTER 310- 455 (1st ed. 1974) (attempting to introduce evidence of Charles Man-
son's influence or brainwashing to mitigate sentencing for murder).
These cases differ from religious cult cases because in these cases brainwashing is used as a
defense to criminal behavior. In religious cult cases, an ex-member is typically proceeding on
an affirmative action for civil damages caused by the religious cult's brainwashing of the indi-
vidual. See infra notes 169-273 and accompanying text.
23. Doctors Langone and Clark set out six varieties of personal harm that arise in the
context of new religions which typically employ coercive persuasion as part of their conversion
process: (1) physical harm, (2) financial exploitation, (3) psychiatric symptomatology, (4) di-
minished personal autonomy, (5) diminished psychological integration, and (6) diminished
critical thinking capacity. MICHAEL D. LANGONE & JOHN G. CLARK, JR., AMERICAN
FAMILY FOUNDATION, NEW RELIGIONS AND PUBLIC POLICY: RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS
FOR SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENTISTS 94-96 (1985) (AFF Report 83-06).
An extreme example of the harm that religious cults can cause their followers is the Jones-
town tragedy of November 18, 1978. On that day, in an isolated community in the jungles of
Guyana, some 900 members of the Peoples Temple followed their charismatic leader, the Rev-
erend Jim Jones, into an unparalleled act of collective suicide. Nightmare in Jonestown, TIME,
Dec. 4, 1978, at 16. Jones exhorted his followers to participate in the "revolutionary suicide"
ritual and to partake of a poisonous mixture of purple Kool-Aid, potassium cyanide and potas-
sium chloride. Id. Parents and nurses used syringes to squirt the deadly concoction onto the
January 1992] COERCIVE PERSUASION
rendered his or her will and autonomy to the religious organization.24
This Comment compares the proof requirements for undue influ-
ence,2 5 involuntary servitude26 and brainwashing.27 While all three are
examples of L-TCP and therefore share many common characteristics,
the proof requirements for each differ. To prove undue influence, psy-
chological duress or influence must be shown.28 To prove a charge of
involuntary servitude, the prosecutor must show that the victim was en-
slaved by a threat of physical or legal force.29 Courts that address brain-
washing in religious cult cases impose various standards: some courts
require a showing of physical duress,3" while others allow recovery where
a plaintiff shows psychological duress or fraud.31
tongues of babies. Id. The older children and adults helped themselves to paper cups filled
with the poison. Id. Within minutes, all were dead. Id.
A detailed analysis (or speculation?) of why more than 900 followers willingly took their
own lives in this apocalyptic ritual is beyond the scope of this Comment. However, commen-
tators have recounted the group's isolation, the control exerted by Jim Jones, Jones' paranoia,
the peer pressure and the cult's comprehensive system of "discipline" (for both children and
adults). MARC GALANTER, CULTS: FAITH, HEALING AND COERCION 119-24 (1989);
GEORGE KLINEMAN ET AL., THE CULT THAT DIED: THE TRAGEDY OF JIM JONES AND THE
PEOPLES TEMPLE 198-221 (1980). According to one writer, these factors led to "a deluded
identification with the leader-aggressor... [where the followers also were] realistically afraid
of resisting his demands and too emotionally dependent to leave." GALANTER, supra, at 122.
24. See LANGONE & CLARK, supra note 23, at 95 (describing diminished personal auton-
omy). One writer has described the brainwashing process as "a system which disrupts an indi-
vidual's identity." HASSAN, supra note 20, at 54. In fact, "[u]nder the influence of [cult
brainwashing], a person's original identity, as formed by family, education, friendship, and
most importantly that person's own free choices, becomes replaced with another identity, often
one that he would not have chosen for himself without tremendous social pressure." Id. (em-
phasis added).
25. Undue influence is analyzed in the context of inter vivos gifts to a religious adviser.
See infra notes 59-95 and accompanying text. Although undue influence can occur in any
confidential relationship, this Comment limits its analysis to undue influence exerted by reli-
gious advisers because of the factual similarity to brainwashing by religious cults.
26. See infra notes 96-135 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 136-274 and accompanying text.
28. California Civil Code § 1575 states:
Undue influence consists: 1. In the use, by one in whom a confidence is reposed by
another, or who holds a real or apparent authority over him [or her], of such confi-
dence or authority for the purpose of obtaining an unfair advantage over him [or
her]; 2. In taking an unfair advantage of another's weakness of mind; or, 3. In taking
a grossly oppressive and unfair advantage of another's necessities or distress.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1575 (West 1982).
29. United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 952-53 (1988) (remanding because jury
instructions for involuntary servitude could have permitted psychological duress as sufficient
to prove crime).
30. See Lewis v. Holy Spirit Ass'n for Unification, 589 F. Supp. 10, 12 (D. Mass. 1983).
31. Molko v. Holy Spirit Ass'n for Unification, 46 Cal. 3d 1092, 1124-25, 762 P.2d 46, 64-
65, 252 Cal. Rptr. 122, 140-41 (1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1084 (1989).
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This Comment analyzes these three legal theories, their common
features32 and the underlying societal and individual interests protected
by each approach.33 All three share the common elements of L-TCP.
This Comment asserts, however, that only the evidentiary requirements
for undue influence adequately protect the underlying personal and socie-
tal interests that these theories seek to protect.34 Requiring a showing of
physical duress in involuntary servitude and brainwashing cases, when
both of these are characterized by a long-term pattern of influence, not
only fails to protect the societal and individual interests at stake,35 but
also defies logic and ignores the underlying wrongs caused by involuntary
servitude and brainwashing.
36
This Comment proposes that the undue influence model, requiring
proof of only psychological duress, be applied in a modified form to both
involuntary servitude37 and brainwashing cases. 38 The undue influence
model would better protect the societal and individual interests impli-
cated in these cases.39
II. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
Undue influence is the legal theory by which gifts to religious advi-
sors41 are set aside when the religious advisors exploit their spiritual au-
thority to exact such "gifts" from individuals over whom they exercise a
32. See infra notes 274-92 and accompanying text for an analysis of undue influence; notes
309-34 and accompanying text for an analysis of involuntary servitude; and notes 351-78 and
accompanying text for an analysis of brainwashing cases.
33. See infra notes 293-300 and accompanying text for a discussion of the interests pro-
tected in undue influence cases; notes 335-39 and accompanying text for the interests protected
in involuntary servitude cases; and notes 406-33 and accompanying text for the interests pro-
tected by brainwashing cases.
34. See infra notes 301-08 and accompanying text.
35. See infra notes 340-50 and accompanying text for a discussion of the failure of the
current proof requirements to protect the underlying interests in involuntary servitude cases
and notes 434-61 and accompanying text which discuss the failure of the current proof require-
ments to protect the interests implicated in brainwashing cases.
36. See infra notes 293-300 and accompanying text for a discussion of the interests pro-
tected in undue influence cases; notes 335-39 and accompanying text for the interests protected
in involuntary servitude cases; and notes 406-33 and accompanying text for the interests pro-
tected by brainwashing cases.
37. See infra notes 467-70 and accompanying text.
38. See infra notes 471-93 and accompanying text.
39. See infra notes 467-93 and accompanying text.
40. Gilmore v. Lee, 86 N.E. 568 (Ill. 1908).
41. Although undue influence can be exerted in other contexts, such as between doctor-
patient, lawyer-client and parent-child, this Comment focuses on undue influence in the con-
text of inter vivos gifts to religious advisers, because of its analytical and factual similarity to
brainwashing by religious cults.
[Vol. 25:499
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pastoral function or with whom they have a fiduciary relationship.42 To
succeed on a claim for undue influence and void the gift, a plaintiff must
show that he or she was "susceptible" to undue influence for the advan-
tage of the donee, that the donee deceived the plaintiff or exerted im-
proper influence over the plaintiff and that the plaintiff submitted to the
"overmastering effect" of the donee's influence.43 The influence can be
physical or mental as long as the coercion was such that the donee's
dominating purposes substituted for the free expression of the plaintiff's
wishes."
A powerful group or individual can subject a less powerful individ-
ual, such as a child45 or a retarded individual with the mental capacity of
a child,46 to involuntary servitude. In these situations, the "master" can
use a variety of coercive techniques, such as physical duress,4 7 fraud48
and psychological duress4 9 to overcome the will of the "servant." The
result is that the servant does his or her master's bidding.5" To success-
fully prosecute an involuntary servitude offense, the government must
show that the enslaved person was held in the state of servitude by virtue
of a physical or legal threat.5 ' Psychological coercion is not sufficient to
show involuntary servitude.52
A religious or pseudo-religious group can use mind control tech-
niques53 to induce individuals to join them as "devotees, fund raisers and
42. Delgado, Religious Totalism, supra note 9, at 94; see, e.g., In re The Bible Speaks, 73
B.R. 848 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1987) (setting aside gift to religious adviser by disturbed young
woman because pastor exerted undue influence), aff'd, 81 B.R. 750 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1988),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 869 F.2d 628 (Bankr. 1st Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 816 (1989).
43. The Bible Speaks, 73 B.R. at 858.
44. Id. at 858-59.
45. See United States v. King, 840 F.2d 1276, 1280-81 (6th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied,
488 U.S. 894 (1988).
46. United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 934-36 (1988).
47. See King, 840 F.2d at 1280.
48. See Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 938.
49. See King, 840 F.2d at 1280-81.
50. See, eg., Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 934-36 (victims found laboring on defendants' farm).
51. Id. at 952. A threat of legal force may also be sufficient for involuntary servitude. Id.
52. Id.
53. Some of the techniques used in coercive persuasion include:
(1) [Isolating] the victim and [exerting] total control over his environment; (2) [con-
trolling] all channels of information and communication; (3) physiological debilita-
tion by means of inadequate diet, insufficient sleep, and poor sanitation; (4)
assignment of meaningless tasks... (5) manipulation of guilt and anxiety; (6) threats
of annihilation by seemingly all-powerful captors, who insist that the victim's sole
chance for survival lies in identifying with them; (7) degradation of and assaults on
the pre-existing self, (8) peer pressure, often applied through ritual "struggle ses-
sions"; (9) required performance of symbolic acts of self-betrayal, betrayal of group
norms, and confession; and (10) alternation of harshness and leniency.
Delgado, Criminal States of Mind, supra note 17, at 1-3 & n.13.
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street-corner proselytizers. '5 4 Different standards of coercion are ap-
plied in brainwashing cases. The California Supreme Court recently up-
held an ex-cult member's claim for fraud against the cult on the basis of
psychological coercion and brainwashing techniques. 5 In contrast, how-
ever, a federal district court in Massachusetts dismissed an ex-cult mem-
ber's claim for brainwashing holding that "[i]ndoctrination and initiation
procedures and conditions of membership in a religious organization are
generally not subject to judicial review."56
Undue influence, involuntary servitude and brainwashing by reli-
gious cults are all examples of coercive persuasion. All three practices
offend basic notions of fairness and freedom because in all three, the vic-
tim's will and autonomy is overcome by the persuader's will.5" Further-
more, because all of these practices are characterized by special
relationships in which the victim trusts the persuader, who exploits the
relationship for his or her own benefit, the exploitation and the victim's
loss of will seems particularly unfair. The courts nonetheless persist in
treating each of these practices differently, applying inconsistent stan-
dards to measure the type and extent of coercion. This makes no sense,
because each of these practices is effectively the same wrong-harming
others by depriving them of the exercise of their free will. Thus, a consis-
tent, interests-based approach should be developed.
III. BACKGROUND
A. Proof Requirements for Undue Influence
The doctrine of undue influence arises when a party seeks to revoke
a gift because the donor's will was overcome by the donee who exploited
54. Id. at 4 & n.18.
55. Molko v. Holy Spirit Ass'n for Unification, 46 Cal. 3d 1092, 1119-20, 762 P.2d 46, 61,
252 Cal. Rptr. 122, 137 (1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1084 (1989).
56. Lewis v. Holy Spirit Ass'n for Unification, 589 F. Supp. 10, 12 (D. Mass. 1983).
57. See infra notes 276-92 and accompanying text for a discussion of undue influence;
infra notes 319-34 and accompanying text for a discussion of involuntary servitude cases; and
infra notes 357-78 and accompanying text for a discussion of brainwashing cases.
58. The concept of will and "voluntariness" is particularly valued in our judicial system.
For an example in the criminal procedure context, see Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S.
218, 225 (1973), which discusses the standard of voluntariness to be used in granting consent
to search. The Court quoted Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602 (1961), which ad-
dressed voluntary confessions:
Is the confession the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its
maker? If it is, if he has willed to confess, it may be used against him. If it is not, if
his will has been overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically impaired,
the use of his confession offends due process.
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 225-26 (quoting Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602 (1961))
(emphasis added).
[Vol. 25:499
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a confidential relationship.59 There are two main undue influence "theo-
ries": (1) the "presumption" model, in which the gift itself combined
with the identity of the donee creates a presumption of undue influence;6"
and (2) the "susceptibility" model, in which the person contesting the
gift is required to show that the donor was susceptible to the donee's
unique position.61 Both of these theories recognize that psychological
duress may be sufficient to overcome another's will.62 Both undue influ-
ence models seek to protect the more susceptible party from the influence
of the stronger personality.63
1. Presumption model of undue influence
Under the presumption model, courts focus on the relationship be-
tween the donor, the more susceptible party, and the donee, the stronger
party. Thus, many cases considering the presence of undue influence in a
nontestamentary gift to a church, cleric or spiritual adviser' have in-
ferred undue influence from the mere existence of a confidential relation-
ship65 between a parishioner and a cleric, or between a spiritual adviser
and an adherent to that spiritual doctrine.6 6 This inference can establish
a prima facie case of undue influence and place the burden of disproving
undue influence on the donee.
67
For example, in Gilmore v. Lee 68 the court set aside a deed made by
59. See The Bible Speaks v. Dovydenas, 81 B.R. 750, 760 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1988), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part, 869 F.2d 628 (Bankr. 1st Cir.), cert denied, 493 U.S. 816 (1989); Held v.
Florida Conference Ass'n of Seventh Day Adventists, 193 So. 828, 832-33 (Fla. 1940); Nelson
v. Dodge, 68 A.2d 51, 57 (R.I. 1949); Morley v. Loughnan, 1 Ch. 736, 752 (Eng. 1893); All-
card v. Skinner, 36 Ch. D. 145, 150 (Eng. 1887); Nottidge v. Prince, 2 Giff. 246, 259, 66 Eng.
Rep. 103, 108-09 (1860); Norton v. Relly, 2 Eden 286, 288-89, 28 Eng. Rep. 908, 908-09
(1764).
60. See infra notes 64-83 and accompanying text.
61. See infra notes 92-95 and accompanying text.
62. See infra notes 64-97 and accompanying text.
63. See infra notes 64-97 and accompanying text.
64. See, eg., Gilmore v. Lee, 86 N.E. 568, 570-71 (Ill. 1908) (setting aside deed made by
elderly parishioner to her priest).
65. Although a confidential and trusting relationship is said to exist between a spiritual
leader and a spiritual follower, the reason for the presumption of undue influence is not that
the donee is a spiritual leader. Instead, it is well recognized that the spiritual leader may have
a fiduciary relationship with the follower "which, if used for the benefit of the donee, will result
in the exercise of an influence not possessed by the ordinary person, and sufficient, according to
the ordinary experience of mankind, to overcome the will of the donor." See generally C.S.
Patrinelis, Annotation, Undue Influence in Nontestamentary Gift to Clergymen, Spiritual Ad-
viser, or Church, 14 A.L.R.2d 649, 657 (1950) (discussing different models of undue influence
in gifts to religious advisers).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 653.
68. 86 N.E. 568 (Il1. 1908).
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an elderly, illiterate, devout parishioner to her parish priest, who was
called to attend to her spiritual needs during her last sickness.69 The
court said:
The law will presume, from the mere existence of the relation,
that the gift was obtained by undue influence or improper
means, and the burden of proof rests upon the donee to show
that it was the free and voluntary act of the donor.... [W]here
a confidential relation exists no other element is necessary to
cast the burden of proof upon the beneficiary.7"
Under traditional undue influence doctrine,v" three factors can
strengthen the presumption. The first is the donor's susceptibility. Thus,
courts have set aside gifts where the donor was aged,72 mentally weak, 3
in a last sickness7' or a religious or spiritual "fanatic. '7  Second, both
English 76 and American77 law impose a duty on a church, cleric or a
spiritual adviser to ascertain that the donor has competent and independ-
ent advice before accepting a nontestamentary gift from a person over
whom they have the power to exercise dominion.78 A breach of this duty
strengthens the presumption.79 Third, when a spiritual adviser actively
seeks a gift from the donee, the presumption is also strengthened.80
There are also three circumstances that weaken the undue influence pre-
69. Id at 570-71.
70. Id. (emphasis added).
71. See Patrinelis, supra note 65, at 660-62.
72. See Dowie v. Driscoll, 68 N.E. 56, 56 (111. 1903) (action to set aside transfer of prop-
erty by ninety-year-old widower); Good v. Zook, 88 N.W. 376, 378-79 (Iowa 1901) (action to
set aside transfer of trust deed and promissory note by eighty-seven-year-old donor).
73. See The Bible Speaks v. Dovydenas, 81 B.R. 750, 760 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1988), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part, 869 F.2d 628 (Bankr. 1st Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 816 (1989); Morley v.
Loughnan, I Ch. 736, 752 (Eng. 1893) (donor subject to momentary attacks of loss of con-
sciousness and nearly total losses of memory).
74. See Gilmore v. Lee, 86 N.E. 568, 569-70 (Ill. 1908) (gift causa mortis-gift given due
to perceived impending death); McPherson v. Byrne, 118 N.W. 985, 985 (Mich. 1909) (same).
75. See Connor v. Stanley, 72 Cal. 556, 560-61, 14 P. 306, 307-08 (1887) (religious devo-
tee); Good, 88 N.W. at 378 (religious visions); Nottidge v. Prince, 2 Giff. 246, 259, 66 Eng.
Rep. 103, 108-09 (1860) (religious delusions).
76. Norton v. Relly, 2 Eden 286, 290, 28 Eng. Rep. 908, 909-10 (1764).
77. Ford v. Hennessy, 70 Mo. 580, 590-91 (1879).
78. See The Bible Speaks v. Dovydenas, 81 B.R. 750, 760 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1988), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part, 869 F.2d 628 (Bankr. 1st Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 816 (1989); Ross v.
Conway, 92 Cal. 632, 636, 28 P. 785, 786 (1892); In re Estate of Miller, 16 Cal. App. 2d 141,
152, 60 P.2d 492, 497 (1936); Gilmore, 86 N.E. at 571 (Ill. 1908); Corrigon v. Pironi, 23 A.
355, 356 (N.J. Eq. 1891); Thompson v. Hefferman, 4 Drury & Warren 285, 291 (Ir. 1843).
79. See Patrinelis, supra note 65, at 666.
80. See Whitmire v. Kroelinger, 42 F.2d 699, 708-09 (D.C. Cir. 1930); The Bible Speaks,
81 B.R. at 759-60; Gilmore, 86 N.E. at 570-71; Caspari v. First German Church of New Jeru-
salem, 82 Mo. 649, 652 (1884); Nelson v. Dodge, 68 A.2d 51, 57 (R.I. 1949).
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sumption: (1) where the spiritual follower had a preexisting intent to
make a gift;"' (2) where the follower had independent advice;8 2 or (3)
where the follower was of sound mind and body. 3
As seen by Gilmore v. Lee, 4 in which a gift given to a parish priest
was set aside for undue influence,85 the traditional model of undue influ-
ence includes the five elements of L-TCP. The donor, Mrs. Knapp, was
an elderly, illiterate woman on her death bed. 6 First, the long-term pat-
tern of influence can be seen from the relationship between the devout
parishioner and her priest.87 The priest was the stronger personality pur-
porting to care about Mrs. Knapp's spiritual welfare as she lay on her
deathbed." The decedent's advanced age, sickness and illiteracy made
her vulnerable.8 9 In fact, the priest, in addition to attending to his pa-
rishioner's last sickness and spiritual needs, also attended to his own ma-
terial needs by persuading the dying woman to give him a deed to her
property. 90 Mrs. Knapp was harmed in two ways: (1) she did not give
the land of her own volition, but rather, at the request of the priest; and
(2) she did not provide for her natural heirs.91 Thus, under this model,
undue influence is an example of L-TCP.
2. Susceptibility model of undue influence
The susceptibility model focuses on the relative weakness of the do-
nor.92 To succeed on a claim for undue influence and void the gift, the
plaintiff must show that he or she was "susceptible" to undue influence
to the advantage of the donee, that the donee deceived or exerted im-
proper influence over plaintiff, and that the plaintiff submitted to the
"overmastering" effect of the donee's influence.93
The susceptibility model differs from the presumption model of un-
81. Klaber v. Unity School of Christianity, 51 S.W.2d 30, 35 (Mo. 1932); see also Patrine-
lis, supra note 65, at 671-77 (discussing several cases in which predisposition to make gift
weakened presumption).
82. Patrinelis, supra note 65, at 666-70.
83. See id. at 664.
84. 86 N.E. 568 (Ill. 1908).
85. Id. at 570-71.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 568.
88. Id. at 569-70.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 569.
91. Id. at 568-69.
92. See supra note 28 for the text of California Civil Code § 1575, which defines undue
influence.
93. See The Bible Speaks v. Dovydenas, 81 B.R. 750, 760 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1988), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part, 869 F.2d 628 (Bankr. 1st Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 816 (1989).
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due influence in that it focuses on the weakness or susceptibility of the
donor. Nonetheless, as discussed below, both the susceptibility and pre-
sumption models protect the same individual interest: freedom from
having one's possessions taken by another whose unique position or rela-
tionship causes one to suspend suspicion and confer upon another a bene-
fit that ordinarily would not be conferred.94 Both models protect this
interest by relying on a model of long-term psychological duress.
95
B. Proof Requirements for Involuntary Servitude
A person who holds another in involuntary servitude is criminally
liable.96 In United States v. Kozminski 97 the United States Supreme
Court defined involuntary servitude as it was set forth in the federal stat-
ute declaring involuntary servitude to be illegal.98
1. Standards for involuntary servitude in United States v. Kozminski
The Court in Kozminski defined involuntary servitude:
[F]or purposes of criminal prosecution.., the term "involun-
tary servitude" necessarily means a condition of servitude in
which the victim is forced to work for the defendant by the use
or threat of physical restraint or physical injury, or by the use
or threat of coercion through law or the legal process. 99
Applying this rule, the Court reversed a conviction against three
operators of a farm who were found to have violated 18 U.S.C. § 241 10
by conspiring to "'injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate' two retarded
men in the free exercise and enjoyment of their federal right to be free
from involuntary servitude." 101
Although the two men were in their sixties when the government
found them working on the farm, they had intelligence quotients of sixty-
94. See infra notes 293-300 and accompanying text for a discussion of the interests pro-
tected in laws invalidating gifts due to undue influence.
95. See supra note 17 and accompanying text which contrasts long-term psychological
duress with short-term physical duress.
96. 18 U.S.C. § 1584 states: "Whoever knowingly and willfully holds to involuntary servi-
tude or sells into any condition of involuntary servitude any other person for any term [shall be
criminally liable]." 18 U.S.C. § 1584 (1988).
97. 487 U.S. 931 (1988).
98. Id
99. Id. at 952.
100. 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1988). This section provides, in pertinent part, that "if two or more
persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any inhabitant.., in the free exer-
cise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him [or her] by the constitution or laws
of the United States, [they shall be criminally liable]." Id.
101. Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 934.
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seven and sixty; they viewed the world and responded to authority as
would an eight- to ten-year-old child."0 2 The two men worked on the
Kozminskis' dairy farm seven days a week, up to seventeen hours a day,
initially for fifteen dollars per week and eventually for no money at all.
10 3
The Kozminskis subjected the two men to verbal and physical abuse and
told their other workers to treat the victims the same way.10
4
The men were told not to leave the farm.l0 ' When the men did
leave the farm, the Kozminskis brought them back 0 6 and even
threatened one of the men with institutionalization if he did not follow
the Kozminskis' orders.10 7 The victims were isolated from neighbors,
relatives, farm hands and visitors 08 and lived in squalor. °9 They were
denied adequate food, housing and medical attention.110
The original conviction was based on a jury instruction that permit-
ted the jury to find involuntary servitude in cases involving general psy-
chological coercion.1 11 The Court reviewed the history of the Thirteenth
Amendment112 and the legislative histories of the statutes outlawing in-
voluntary servitude.
1 13
One of the precursors to 18 U.S.C. § 1584,114 the statute against
involuntary servitude, was the 1874 Padrone statute.11 ' The "Padrones"
took young Italian boys from their families, brought them to large cities
in the United States, and put them to work as beggars or street musi-
102. Id. at 934-35.
103. Id. at 935.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. In his concurring opinion, Justice Brennan cited evidence introduced by the gov-
ernment that the victims were denied medical care "even when one was gored by a bull and the
tip of the other's thumb was cut off." Id. at 956 n.3 (Brennan, J., concurring).
111. Id. at 937-38. The jury instruction provided:
[Biased on all the evidence it will be for you to determine if there was a means of
compulsion used, sufficient in kind and degree, to subject a person having the same
general station in life as the alleged victims to believe they had no reasonable means
of escape and no choice except to remain in the service of the employer.
Id. at 937.
112. Id. at 940. The Thirteenth Amendment provides in pertinent part: "Neither slavery
nor involuntary servitude... shall exist within the United States." U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
113. Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 944-48.
114. See supra note 96.
115. The Padrone statute was formerly codified at 18 U.S.C. § 446 (1940) (repealed 1947).
In 1947 Congress consolidated both the Slave Trade statute, as amended in 1909, formerly 18
U.S.C. § 423 (1940) (repealed 1947), and the Padrone statute, formerly 18 U.S.C. § 446 (1940)
(repealed 1947), into 18 U.S.C. § 1584. Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 945.
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cians. 116 In 1874, Congress enacted the Padrone statute "to prevent
[this] practice of enslaving, buying, selling or using Italian children."
'1 17
The Court in Kozminski concluded that the current statute "was
intended to have the same substantive reach as [the prior] statutes,"'""
including the Padrone statute. One of the conditions that the Padrone
statute was intended to address-isolation from family so as to be put
into a vulnerable position-is an element of psychological coercion.1 19
The Court's reliance on section 1584's history as rationale for adopting a
physical duress standard in Kozminski 2 0 is therefore puzzling. A plau-
sible argument could be made that Kozminski actually supports a psy-
chological duress model. Nonetheless, Justice O'Connor, writing for the
majority, ultimately articulated a physical or legal duress requirement for
involuntary servitude. 21
Nor does Justice Brennan's concurring opinion in Kozminski sup-
port a psychological duress model. Justice Brennan agreed that "the typ-
ical techniques now used to hold persons in slavelike conditions are not
limited to physical or legal means." '22 However, he proposed that a
court look to the "slavelike" conditions that Congress intended to eradi-
cate with the Thirteenth Amendment.123 Justice Brennan asserted that
"'servitude' generally denotes a relation of complete domination and
116. Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 947.
117. Id. (quoting 43d Cong., 1st Sess., 2 CoNG. REc. 4443 (1874)).
118. Id. at 945. Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, stated:
Congress believed these terms to be limited to situations involving physical or legal
coercion [which] is confirmed when we examine the actual physical conditions facing
the victims of the padrone system. These young children were literally stranded in
large, hostile cities in a foreign country... without... assistance, without family,
and without other sources of support, these children... had no choice but to work
for their masters or risk physical harm. The padrones took advantage of the special
vulnerabilities of their victims, placing them in situations where they were physically
unable to leave.
Id. at 947-48.
119. Delgado, Criminal States of Mind, supra note 17, at 2.
120. Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 947-48.
121. Id. at 948.
122. Id. at 956 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan's description of the techniques
used in the Kozminski case are very similar to techniques used in coercive persuasion or
brainwashing:
[D]isorienting the victims with frequent verbal abuse and complete authoritarian
domination; inducing poor health by denying medical care and subjecting the victims
to substandard food, clothing and living conditions; working the victims from 3 a.m.
to 8:30 p.m. with no days off, leaving them tired and without free time to seek alter-
native work, denying the victims any payment for their labor; and active efforts to
isolate the victims from contact with outsiders who might help them.
Id. (Brennan, J., concurring); see Delgado, Criminal States of Mind, supra note 17, at 1, 2-3 &
n.13.
123. Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 961 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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lack of personal liberty resembling the conditions in which slaves were
held prior to the Civil War.""12 Thus, a defendant who, as a result of
intentional coercion, employs persons in conditions resembling slavery
would be guilty of involuntary servitude."' 5
Finally, Justice Stevens's concurring opinion advocates a case-by-
case approach to evaluating what conduct constitutes involuntary servi-
tude. 126 Justice Stevens rejected the majority's position that the reach of
the involuntary servitude statute "extends beyond compulsion . . .
accompanied by actual or threatened physical means or by the threat of
legal action." '127 He also rejected Justice Brennan's requirement that the
victims be coerced into a "slavelike condition of servitude"128 because it
"simply mirror[ed] the term 'involuntary servitude' ""9 and added a
"level of definitional complexity."' 130 Justice Stevens then proposed that
in ascertaining whether the victim was in servitude involuntarily, a court
should use a "totality of the circumstances" approach, as used in cases
determining "whether a custodial statement is voluntary or
involuntary."
1 31
The physical duress requirement the Court imposes in Kozminski
does not alter the fact that involuntary servitude is another example of L-
TCP. Kozminski illustrates the long-term pattern of influence on en-
slaved workers even if physical duress were present.1 32 The defendants
were the stronger individuals not only because their victims were men-
tally retarded, but because they owned the farm and were the "employ-
ers" of their victims. 133 Although they brought their victims off the
streets, supposedly so that the victims could avoid institutionalization,
they exploited the victims by forcing them to work long hours with no
pay. 3 The victims were harmed by their exploitation and by the abuse
the defendants dealt them, whether or not the United States Supreme
Court acknowledged their enslavement.
135
124. Id. (Brennan, J., concurring).
125. Id. at 964 (Brennan, J., concurring).
126. Id. at 965-66 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun joined in this concurrence.
Id. at 965 (Stevens, J., concurring).
127. Id. at 969 (Stevens, J., concurring).
128. Id. at 961 (Brennan, J., concurring).
129. Id. at 969 (Stevens, J., concurring).
130. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
131. Id. at 970 (Stevens, J., concurring).
132. One of the men had "worked" for the Kozminskis for 10 years; the other had been
there 16 years. Id. at 935.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
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C. Proof Requirements for Brainwashing by Religious Cults
First Amendment free exercise and free establishment of religion is-
sues arise when a plaintiff claims coercive persuasion by a religious
group. Therefore, these constitutional constraints must first be ad-
dressed. 36 Assuming that the plaintiff surmounts the constitutional lim-
itations, the indoctrination process by which religious cults obtain
converts-including coercive persuasion-is not tortious per se.
137
Therefore, plaintiffs use evidence of brainwashing by sects to prove an
element of a tort, such as fraud,"' 8 intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress 139 or false imprisonment. 40
1. Constitutional issues in cult brainwashing cases
Under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution,
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof." '141 The Free Exercise Clause guar-
antees that the government will not prevent the people from freely pursu-
ing any chosen religion.
The First Amendment only protects claims rooted in religious be-
lief,142 and the Free Exercise Clause protects these beliefs absolutely. 143
While a court can inquire into the sincerity of a person's beliefs, it may
not judge the truth or falsity of those beliefs. 1"
136. See infra notes 141-53.
137. Lewis v. Holy Spirit Ass'n for Unification, 589 F. Supp. 10, 12 (D. Mass. 1983); Mur-
phy v. I.S.K.CON., 571 N.E.2d 340, 348 (Mass.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 191 (1991); Meroni v.
Holy Spirit Ass'n for Unification, 506 N.Y.S.2d 174, 177 (App. Div. 1986), appeal dismissed,
504 N.E.2d 698 (N.Y. 1987); Application of Conversion Center, Inc., 130 A.2d 107, 110 (Pa.
1957); see infra notes 154-68 and accompanying text.
138. See Molko v. Holy Spirit Ass'n for Unification, 46 Cal. 3d 1092, 1101, 762 P.2d 46, 49,
252 Cal. Rptr. 122, 125 (1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1084 (1989). See also infra notes 171-79
and accompanying text for a discussion of the Molko case.
139. See Molko, 46 Cal. 3d at 1101, 762 P.2d at 49, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 125; George v. Inter-
national Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness (ISKCON), 262 Cal. Rptr. 217, 231 (Ct. App. 1989)
(depublished opinion), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2168 (1990), cert. granted and vacated, 111 S.
Ct. 1299 (1991); Meroni, 506 N.Y.S.2d at 175; Christofferson v. Church of Scientology, 644
P.2d 577, 581 (Or. Ct. App.), petition denied, 650 P.2d 928 (Or. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1206 (1983); see also infra notes 188-238 and accompanying text.
140. See Molko, 46 Cal. 3d at 1123, 762 P.2d at 64, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 140; George, 262 Cal.
Rptr. at 231; see also infra notes 239-73 and accompanying text.
141. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
142. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972).
143. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940).
144. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944), defined the parameters of the constitu-
tional protection of religious faith. There defendants, founders of the "I am" movement, were
alleged to have fraudulently represented that they were divine messengers, that they had mi-
raculous powers to heal all diseases and that they, in fact, had cured hundreds of afflicted
[Vol. 25:499
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While religious belief is absolutely protected, religiously motivated
conduct is not.14 Religiously motivated conduct "remains subject to
regulation for the protection of society." '146 Traditional First Amend-
ment analysis requires that governmental action burdening religious con-
duct be subjected to a balancing test, in which the importance of the
state's interest is weighed against the severity of the burden imposed on
religion. 147 The more severe the burden on religion, the more compelling
the government interest must be.
148
people. Id. at 86-87. As a result of these misrepresentations, they obtained money from the
public through the mail. Id. At trial, the court refused to allow the issue of the truth or falsity
of defendants' claims of divine designation and miraculous powers to go to the jury; the sole
issue submitted was whether defendants' held a good faith belief in these claims. Id. The
Supreme Court affirmed and reasoned:
The religious views espoused by respondents might seem incredible, if not preposter-
ous, to most people. But if those doctrines are subject to trial before a jury charged
with finding their truth or falsity, then the same can be done with the religious beliefs
of any sect. When the triers of fact undertake that task, they enter a forbidden
domain.
Id. at 87.
A similar case where the court held that the act or conduct of a religious organization was
protected from judicial scrutiny because the proof offered called into question the truth or
falsity of the religious beliefs is Founding Church of Scientology v. United States, 409 F.2d
1146, 1149 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 963 (1969).
145. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402-03 (1963).
146. Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 304.
147. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 214. After the United States Supreme Court decision in Employ-
ment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990), it is unclear
whether the compelling state interest test will continue to be used where religiously motivated
conduct conflicts with civil actions. Smith addressed a criminal prohibition against using pe-
yote where the challengers used peyote as part of a Native American religious ceremony. Id.
at 1597-98. Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, asserted that the balancing test set forth in
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402-03 (1963), would not "require exemptions from a gener-
ally applicable criminal law." Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1603.
The United States Supreme Court has yet to address the applicability of the compelling
state interest test to non-criminal law. Nonetheless, several circuits have held that under
Smith, the state need no longer show a compelling state interest when a generally applicable
civil law impinges on religiously motivated conduct. See Vandiver v. Hardin County, 925 F.2d
927 (6th Cir. 1991) (enforcing equivalency testing requirement for high school student to gain
credit for his religious home study program did not violate Free Exercise Clause); Salvation
Army v. Department of Community Affairs, 919 F.2d 183 (3d Cir. 1990) (religious group that
operated family center for disadvantaged persons not exempt from state statute regulating
boardinghouses); Rector of St. Bartholomew's Church v. City of New York, 914 F.2d 348 (2d
Cir. 1990) (limiting church's options to raise revenue as result of city's Landmarks Preserva-
tion Law not violation of Free Exercise Clause); Intercommunity Center for Justice & Peace v.
INS, 910 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1990) (religious organization not exempt from compliance with
Immigration Reform and Control Act); Montgomery v. County of Clinton, 743 F. Supp. 1253
(W.D. Mich. 1990) (statute mandating autopsies of all violent deaths not violation of First
Amendment).
148. Compare Yoder, 406 U.S. at 221-25 (government's strong interest in education insuffi-
cient to justify educational requirement threatening continued survival of Old Order Amish
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If the government action passes this balancing test, it must also meet
two additional requirements. First, there must be no less burdensome
alternative which would satisfy the government's interest.1 4 9 Second, the
action must have the purpose and effect of advancing the state's secular
goals and must not discriminate between religions, or between religion
and non-religion.1 50
Judicial sanctioning of tort recovery constitutes a state action which
is sufficient to invoke constitutional protection. 51 This does not mean,
however, that religious groups are immune from all tort liability. Reli-
gious groups may be held liable in tort for secular acts.152 Moreover,
courts will recognize tort liability even for acts that are religiously
motivated. 153
2. Coercive persuasion is not tortious per se
When a religious sect subjects potential recruits or members to
highly programmed behavior techniques154 to indoctrinate them into the
group, that religious indoctrination is not in itself tortious. The three
main cases holding religious indoctrination to be not tortious, if unac-
companied by physical force or threat, are Lewis v. Holy Spirit Ass'n for
Unification, 55 Meroni v. Holy Spirit Ass'n for Unification,'56 and Applica-
communities) with Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 508-10 (1986) (government's rea-
sonable interest in uniform military attire sufficient to justify mild burden on religious expres-
sion created by ban against Jewish officer wearing yarmulke).
149. Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981); Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 407-08; Braun-
feld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 607 (1961).
150. Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 607.
151. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265 (1964).
152. See, e.g., Malloy v. Fong, 37 Cal. 2d 356, 372, 232 P.2d 241, 250-51 (1951) (holding
religious corporation liable for negligent driving by employee).
153. See, e.g., Candy H. v. Redemption Ranch, Inc., 563 F. Supp. 505, 516 (M.D. Ala.
1983) (allowing action for false imprisonment against religious group); Van Schaick v. Church
of Scientology of Cal., Inc., 535 F. Supp. 1125, 1135 (D. Mass. 1982) ("Causes of action based
upon some proscribed conduct may, thus, withstand a motion to dismiss even if the alleged
wrongdoer acts upon a religious belief or if organized for a religious purpose."); O'Moore v.
Driscoll, 135 Cal. App. 770, 778, 28 P.2d 438, 444 (1933) (allowing priest's action against his
superiors for false imprisonment as part of their effort to obtain his confession of sins); Bear v.
Reformed Mennonite Church, 341 A.2d 105, 107 (Pa. 1975) (allowing action for interference
with marriage and business interests when church ordered congregation to "shun" former
member).
154. These techniques would include intensive physical exercise, isolation, lectures, confes-
sion, strict work and study schedules. See, eg., Meroni v. Holy Spirit Ass'n for Unification,
506 N.Y.S.2d 174, 177 (App. Div. 1986), appeal dismissed, 504 N.E.2d 698 (N.Y. 1987); see
also Delgado, Religious Totalism, supra note 9, at 50-55, for a general discussion of coercive
techniques used by religious cults.
155. 589 F. Supp. 10 (D. Mass. 1983).
156. 506 N.Y.S.2d 174 (App. Div. 1986), appeal dismissed, 504 N.E.2d 698 (N.Y. 1987).
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tion of Conversion Center, Inc. 157
In Lewis a former member of the Unification Church'58 sued in tort
alleging, inter alia, that the Church subjected him to brainwashing result-
ing in psychiatric disorders.' 59 The court dismissed the plaintiff's claims
and said:
Both of the plaintiff's claims in tort are seriously flawed. In-
doctrination and initiation procedures and conditions of mem-
bership in a religious organization are generally not subject to
judicial review. Similarly, the plaintiff has not indicated any
precedent for recognition of the tort of brainwashing, and my
own research has revealed none. 6°
The plaintiff's son in Meroni had entered the training and indoctri-
nation program of the Unification Church. 6 ' One month later he left
the program and committed suicide. 162 His father contended that the
Church subjected the decedent, an emotionally disturbed youth, to
highly programmed behavior techniques to brainwash the youth into
joining the Church. 163 The court dismissed the action and opined that
the Church's indoctrination methods were not tortious' 14 in the absence
of physical violence. 6
Similarly, the court in Application of Conversion Center, Inc. 16 6 rec-
157. 130 A.2d 107 (Pa. 1957).
158. Lewis, 589 F. Supp. at 11-12.
159. Id. at 12.
160. Id.
161. Meroni, 506 N.Y.S.2d at 175.
162. Id.
163. Id. (father claimed Church had used intensive physical exercise, isolation, lectures,
confession, strict work and study schedules as method for indoctrinating son).
164. The court in Meroni said:
The conduct of the defendant Unification Church... which the plaintiff seeks to
classify as tortious, constitutes common and accepted religious proselytizing prac-
tices, e.g., fasting, chanting, physical exercises, cloistered living, confessions, lectures,
and a highly structured work and study schedule. To the extent that the plaintiff
alleges that the decedent was 'brainwashed' as a result of the church's program, this
claim must be viewed in the context of the situation as a whole, i.e., as a method of
religious indoctrination that is neither extreme nor outrageous.
Id. at 177.
165. Id. at 177-78. The court stated:
It is important to note that no facts are set forth which would warrant the conclusion
that the plaintiff's decedent was falsely imprisoned by the appellant or that he was
subjected to any form of violence .... The claim of brainwashing is based upon the
activities heretofore described, which, as previously noted, are commonly used by
religious and other groups, and are accepted by society as legitimate means of indoc-
trination. They are not classifiable as so extreme or outrageous, or offensive to soci-
ety, as to incur liability therefor.
Id.
166. 130 A.2d 107 (Pa. 1957).
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ognized that persuasion is an integral part of many religious organiza-
tions and a positively protected aspect of the free exercise of religion.
16 7
Brainwashing was thus held not to be a tort.
1 68
3. Brainwashing as an element in a tort action against a cult
Assuming that judicial review is constitutional, the inquiry becomes
even more complex. The process of coercive persuasion or brainwashing
is not a tort by itself, but is an element of different torts, including fraud,
intentional infliction of emotional distress and false imprisonment.
a. fraud
Molko v. Holy Spirit Ass'n for Unification 169 addressed claims of
brainwashing in a suit for fraud 170 by two former members of a religious
cult. The plaintiffs, Leal and Molko, contended that certain members of
the Unification Church knowingly misrepresented the Church's identity
with the intent to induce each of them to associate with and to eventually
join the Church.171 They claimed justifiable reliance on the misrepresen-
167. The court stated:
The 14th Amendment of the Constitution of the United States which incorporates
the 1st Amendment, guarantees the free exercise of religion .... Not only is a citizen
of this country entitled to the free expression of his religious beliefs, but he may by
peaceful persuasion endeavor to convert others thereto, and we are aware of no bar to
individuals organizing to effectuate their guaranteed rights in this regard.... Propa-
gation of belief-or even of disbelief in the supernatural-is protected whether in
church or chapel, mosque or synagogue, tabernacle or meetinghouse.
Id. at 110 (quoting Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 593 (1940)).
168. Id.
169. 46 Cal. 3d 1092, 762 P.2d 46, 252 Cal. Rptr. 122 (1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1084
(1989).
170. The plaintiffs also sued for intentional infliction of emotional distress, false imprison-
ment and restitution. Id. at 1101, 762 P.2d at 49, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 125.
171. In Molko the plaintiffs David Molko and Tracy Leal were each approached by mem-
bers of the Unification Church on two separate occasions while waiting at bus stops in the San
Francisco area. The members represented to Molko that they were members of "an 'interna-
tional community' of socially conscious people from different occupations who met in the eve-
nings to discuss important issues." Id. at 1102, 762 P.2d at 50, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 126.
Different members of the Church told Leal that they were "part of the 'Creative Community
Project,'.. . a group of socially concerned professional people involved in good works such as
giving food to the poor." Id. at 1105, 762 P.2d at 52, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 128. Both Molko and
Leal asked the members if they were part of religious groups; the Church members responded
that they were not. Id at 1102, 1106, 762 P.2d at 50, 52, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 126, 128. In fact,
the Church members' purpose in inviting the plaintiffs to dinner was to recruit Molko and Leal
into the Church. Id.
At dinner, the plaintiffs were isolated and group members held them in constant conversa-
tion. Id. Molko and Leal then heard lectures on general social problems and saw a slide show
on "Boonville"-a "farm" or rural getaway owned by the people at the house. Id. at 1103,
1106, 762 P.2d at 50, 52, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 126, 128. They were invited to visit the farm at the
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tations when they unknowingly agreed to participate in the Church's ac-
tivities and "suffered psychological and financial damage as a result of
their involvement." 172 Leal and Molko claimed that they would not
have chosen to associate with the group had they known the members
belonged to the Unification Church.'73
The Church asserted that there was no justifiable reliance because
Molko and Leal discovered the group's true identity prior to becoming
formal members of the Church. 74 In response, plaintiffs asserted that by
the time the Church disclosed its true identity, the Church's intense in-
doctrination process had already rendered plaintiffs incapable of refusing
to join.' 75 Molko and Leal asserted that "the Church deceived them into
a setting in which they could be 'brainwashed,' and that the Church
could not then 'cure' its deception by telling plaintiffs the truth after their
involuntary indoctrination" was already accomplished.' 76
The court reviewed the concept of brainwashing and found support
conclusion of the presentation; within a few minutes they were on a bus headed for Boonville.
Id.
Molko and Leal were led to believe that they would receive some relaxed time in the
country at Boonville. Id. Instead, the day's schedule was a tightly planned regimen of group
calisthenics, lectures and discussions, interrupted only by meals and shower breaks. Id. at
1103, 762 P.2d at 50, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 126. This exercise-lecture-discussion regimen contin-
ued for several days. Id. at 1104, 762 P.2d at 51, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 127. Both Molko and Leal
became tired, confused and uncomfortable, but each was assured that the group was not affili-
ated with the Unification Church and each was urged to give the group a few more days. Id.
at 1103-04, 762 P.2d at 50-51, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 126-27.
Finally, after twelve days with the group, a church member revealed to Molko that the
group was part of the Unification Church, but that the deception had been "necessary because
people who had heard negative stories about the Church tended to be unreceptive if they knew
the group's identity before hearing what it had to say." Id. at 1104, 762 P.2d at 51, 252 Cal.
Rptr. at 127. Molko was confused and angry; nonetheless, at the group's urging he stayed
with the group for several weeks before formally joining the Church. Id. at 1104-05, 762 P.2d
at 50-51, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 127. Several months later, Molko was abducted by "deprogram-
mers" hired by his parents. Id. at 1105, 762 P.2d at 51, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 127. Molko ended
his association with the Unification Church after three days of deprogramming. Id. See infra
note 195 for a discussion of deprogramming.
Leal was subjected to twenty-two days of the exercise-lecture-discussion regimen before
the group informed her that it was affiliated with the Unification Church. Molko, 46 Cal. 3d at
1106, 762 P.2d at 52, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 128. Prior to that, Leal had specifically inquired on at
least two occasions whether the group members were "Moonies;" she was assured that they
were not. Id. Leal nonetheless remained with the Church after learning its identity and be-
came a formal Church member. Id. She then went to work on the streets of Los Angeles,
selling flowers to raise money for the Church. Id. Two months later, she was abducted by
deprogrammers hired by her parents and renounced her affiliation with the Church. Id.
172. Id. at 1108, 762 P.2d at 53, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 129.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 1108, 762 P.2d at 54, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 130.
175. Id. at 1108-09, 762 P.2d at 54, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 130.
176. Id. at 1109, 762 P.2d at 54, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 130.
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for both sides of the debate as to whether brainwashing existed. 177 As
the court found no constitutional bars to bringing the action for fraud,
17 1
the plaintiffs' action survived the Church's motion for summary
judgment.1
79
In effect, the court in Molko allowed a model of psychological brain-
washing to be used to prove justifiable reliance in a fraud action. There
were no allegations of physical duress or physical restraint. The
Church's practices, which included isolating the members and control-
ling all channels of information and communication combined with
physiological debilitation by means of inadequate diet and insufficient
sleep, were sufficient to show brainwashing.' 80
Molko also illustrates how brainwashing fits into the L-TCP model.
The long-term influence is shown by the length of time the members of
the Unification Church spent influencing the plaintiffs before revealing
their true identity.' By outnumbering and isolating the plaintiffs, the
177. Id. at 1109-10, 762 P.2d at 54-55, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 130-31. "[T]he existence of such
differing view[s] compel[led] the conclusion that Molko and Leal's theory indeed raise[d] a
factual question-viz., whether Molko and Leal were brainwashed-which, if not prohibited
by other considerations, preclude[d] a grant of summary judgment for the Church." Id. at
1110, 762 P.2d at 55, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 131.
178. The court in Molko analyzed the constitutionality of the fraud action according to
traditional First Amendment analysis and prior to the decision in Employment Division, De-
partment of Human Resources v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990). See supra note 147 for a
description of Smith's likely impact on traditional First Amendment analysis. The court in
Molko found that "the Church's practice of concealing its identity in order to bring unsuspect-
ing outsiders into its highly structured environment" was religiously motivated conduct that
could be regulated for the protection of society. Molko, 46 Cal. 3d at 1117, 762 P.2d at 59, 252
Cal. Rptr. at 135. Furthermore, judicial sanctioning of fraud claims against a religious institu-
tion's deceptive practices was justified by a compelling state interest and was the least restric-
tive means available. Id. at 1117-19, 762 P.2d at 61-62, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 136-37. Finally,
allowing such fraud claims "ha[d] the purpose and effect of advancing the state's secular goals
and... [did] not discriminate between religions, or between religion and nonreligion." Id. at
1119, 762 P.2d at 61, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 137.
This result would not be changed by the Smith decision, which, according to many com-
mentators, effectively eliminated the compelling state interest test. See, e.g., Michael W. Mc-
Connell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHi. L. REv. 1109, 1110
(1990); Raymond C. O'Brien & Michael T. Flannery, The Pending Gauntlet to Free Exercise
Mandating that Clergy Report Child Abuse, 25 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1, 11-18 (1991); Eddie Lam,
Note, Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith: The Limits of the
Free Exercise Clause, 16 T. MARSHALL L. REv. 377, 378 (1991).
179. Molko, 46 Cal. 3d at 1120, 762 P.2d at 61, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 137.
180. Id. at 1119-20, 762 P.2d at 61, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 137.
181. Plaintiff Molko did not learn the identity of the group until he had spent twelve days
with group members. Id. at 1104, 762 P.2d at 51, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 127. Plaintiff Leal was
subjected to twenty-two days of the exercise-lecture-discussion regimen before the group in-
formed her that it was affiliated with the Unification Church. Id. at 1106, 762 P.2d at 52, 252
Cal. Rptr. at 128.
[Vol. 25:499
January 1992] COERCIVE PERSUASION
cult members became the stronger parties vis-A-vis the plaintiffs who
were rendered more susceptible by the mind-numbing rituals of the
group-" 2 The cult purported to offer the plaintiffs an opportunity to par-
ticipate in meaningful social activity,"8 3 but instead exploited the plain-
tiffs for their labor. 84 This exploitation harmed the plaintiffs.'
The Unification Church group members seemed to offer plaintiffs
Leal and Molko the opportunity to make their lives more meaningful. ' 6
Instead, the Unification Church exploited their idealism and used L-TCP
to deprive plaintiffs of their freedom of mentation. 8 7 Plaintiffs Leal and
Molko were thus unfairly deprived of their First Amendment right to
exercise the religion of their choice.
b. intentional infliction of emotional distress
Plaintiffs have asserted claims for intentional infliction of emotional
distress (IIED) in four cases involving brainwashing by religious cults.' 8
Interestingly, the courts often define this tort in a manner similar to un-
due influence: "an abuse by the actor of a position, or a relation with the
other, which gives him actual or apparent authority over the other, or
182. See supra note 171 for a discussion of the Unification Church's approach to indoctri-
nating the Molko plaintiffs. Furthermore, the plaintiffs were already emotionally vulnerable
when the church members approached them. Plaintiff Molko had completed law school, but
arrived in San Francisco "unsure about his future." Molko, 46 Cal. 3d at 1102, 762 P.2d at 49,
252 Cal. Rptr. at 125. Plaintiff Leal arrived in San Francisco en route to Humboldt State
University. Id. at 1105, 762 P.2d at 51-52, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 127-28. She was considering
transferring there after her freshmen year at San Diego State University. Id.
183. Molko, 46 Cal. 3d at 1102-03, 1105, 762 P.2d at 50, 52, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 126, 128.
184. Id. at 1103-06, 762 P.2d at 50-52, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 127-28.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 1102, 1105, 762 P.2d at 50, 52, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 126, 128.
187. Mentation relates to cognition, understanding, emotion or generally to any mental
function or activity. Michael H. Shapiro, Legislating the Control of Behavior Control: Auton-
omy and the Coercive Use of Organic Therapies, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 237, 246 n.14 (1974). The
right of mentation is protected by the First Amendment. Id. at 253-76.
188. See Molko, 46 Cal. 3d at 1101, 762 P.2d at 49, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 125; George v. Inter-
national Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 262 Cal. Rptr. 217, 231 (Ct. App. 1989) (depub-
lished opinion), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2168 (1990), cert granted and vacated, 111 S. Ct. 1299
(1991); Meroni v. Holy Spirit Ass'n for Unification, 506 N.Y.S.2d 174, 175 (App. Div. 1986),
appeal dismissed, 504 N.E.2d 698 (N.Y. 1987); Christofferson v. Church of Scientology, 644
P.2d 577, 581 (Or. Ct. App.), petition denied, 650 P.2d 928 (Or. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1206 (1983).
In denying review, the California Supreme Court ordered that George should not be offi-
cially published. George v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, No. S012425, 1989
Cal. LEXIS 5077, at *1 (Nov. 30, 1989). This case is not being cited in this Comment as
authority or as precedent. Instead, George is discussed to illustrate the treatment accorded
brainwashing claims in various torts.
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power to affect his interests." 1 9 Nonetheless, in only one case did a
court find brainwashing to violate this standard.
i. Christofferson v. Church of Scientology
In Christofferson v. Church of Scientology,1 9° Julie Christofferson
graduated from high school in Eureka, Montana and moved to Portland,
Oregon,191 where she became involved in the Church of Scientology.1 92
Her involvement continued to the point where she elected to forego col-
lege and move to Delphian, a Scientology training center.1 93 When she
189. Christofferson, 644 P.2d at 583 (quoting Turman v. Central Billing Bureau, 568 P.2d
1382, 1391 (Or. 1977)). See also Molko, which states that outrageous behavior may occur
where a defendant "'(1) abuses a relation or position which gives him power to damage the
plaintiff's interest; (2) knows the plaintiff is susceptible to injuries through mental distress; or
(3) acts intentionally or unreasonably with the recognition that the acts are likely to result in
illness through mental distress....'" Molko, 46 Cal. 3d at 1122, 762 P.2d at 63, 252 Cal.
Rptr. at 139 (quoting Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Protection Dist., 43 Cal. 3d 148, 155 n.7, 729
P.2d 743, 747 n.7, 233 Cal. Rptr. 308, 312 n.7 (1987)).
190. 644 P.2d 577, 581 (Or. Ct. App.), petition denied, 650 P.2d 928 (Or. 1982), cert. de-
nied, 459 U.S. 1206 (1983).
191. Id. at 580.
192. Id. at 582. On the advice of a friend, shortly after her arrival in Portland Julie Chris-
tofferson paid the Church of Scientology $50 and enrolled in one of their communications
courses. Id. Two weeks after completing this course, she paid $250 and signed up for another
course. Id. at 587. Christofferson then paid $1880 for a number of hours of "auditing."
Scientology teaches that by "clearing" or "auditing" the mind, one can improve both
spiritual and bodily health. L. RON HUBBARD, DIANETICS: THE MODERN SCIENCE OF
MENTAL HEALTH 91-108 (1950). The vast literature describing Scientology claims, inter alia,
that many bodily ailments, including cancer, may be cured by auditing. See id. at 92, 93.
In Christofferson the court found:
Because Julie did not have the money to pay for the hours of auditing she was told
she would need, she was coached by defendant's staff members to borrow money
from friends and family. She succeeded in borrowing $700-$800 from friends and
family and another $500 from Freedom Federal Credit Union, which is operated by
Scientologists.
Christofferson, 644 P.2d at 587.
193. Christofferson, 644 P.2d at 582. Julie was led to believe that her courses at Delphian
could be applied toward a college degree. Id. At Delphian:
[S]he would learn about architecture and engineering "from the ground up" and ...
Delphian was partially funded by government grants for doing research in solar and
wind energy and recycling. [Julie] decided that going to Delphian would be the best
way to combine her interests in architecture and engineering with her interest in
Scientology and Dianetics.
Id.
Julie's experience at Delphian was not exactly the typical collegiate experience:
Julie was assigned to live in a room with two other women and two children.... She
worked harvesting crops for a couple of weeks after she arrived and then helped to
move an old garbage dump on the property.... In the evenings, she worked indoors
cleaning floors, washing dishes and other such tasks.... Her work day extended
from 8:30 a.m. to 11 p.m. or later... She received wages of a few dollars a week.
Id. at 589. Delphian also controlled its members' contact with the outside world. "Visitors
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returned home several months later to visit her mother,194 Julie's parents
locked her in the house and deprogrammed'
95 her. 196
Julie then filed suit against the Church of Scientology for outrageous
conduct, 197 alleging that defendants schemed to "gain control of her
mind and to force her into a life of service."19 The Oregon Court of
Appeals reversed the jury verdict for plaintiff and remanded.1 99
The court first discussed Oregon's outrageous conduct laws. 2 ° The
initial consideration was whether there was a "special relationship" be-
tween the plaintiff and the defendant because the court characterized
outrageous conduct as "an abuse by the actor of a position, or a relation
with the other, which gives him actual or apparent authority over the
other, or power to affect his interests."' 20 ' The court admitted that this
were [discouraged] at Delphian .... Julie was reprimanded [when her mother made an unan-
nounced visit].... [Her] mail was sometimes opened before she received it." Id.
194. When Julie communicated to the Scientology group that her mother was unhappy
with her involvement in the group, the group told her to leave Delphian until Julie could
"handle" her parents. Id. "Handling" one's parents entailed convincing them to sign a state-
ment that they would not sue, attack or embarrass Scientology or Delphian. Id. If Julie could
not handle her parents, she was to "disconnect," or cut off all relations with her parents if she
was to stay involved with the Church. Id.
195. Deprogramming is "a form of marathon encounter therapy designed to neutralize the
effects of cult conditioning and restore the victim's mental independence." Delgado, Religious
Totalism, supra note 9, at 78. This process challenges the basis of the victim's dependence on
cult leaders. Id. The deprogrammer attempts to show the victim that he or she has been
"manipulated and duped" and points out the inconsistencies in the cultist's beliefs. Id. at 78-
79.
The use of deprogramming to separate cult members from their groups is controversial.
See Douglas Aronin, Cults, Deprogramming and Guardianship: A Model Legislative Proposal,
17 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 163, 180-86 (1982); Terri I. Siegel, Comment, Deprogramming
Religious Cultists, 11 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 807, 826-28 (1978). Cult members and religious
groups have brought suit against both deprogrammers and the parents who have hired them.
See Weiss v. Patrick, 453 F. Supp. 717 (D.R.I.) (alleging deprogrammer violated plaintiff's
civil rights by holding her against her will), aff'd without opinion, 588 F.2d 818 (1st Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 442 U.S. 929 (1979); Peterson v. Sorlien, 299 N.W.2d 123 (Minn. 1980) (alleging
intentional infliction of emotional distress and false imprisonment against deprogrammer),
cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1031 (1981).
196. Christofferson, 644 P.2d at 590.
197. Id. at 581. The tort of outrageous conduct is the same as intentional infliction of
emotional distress. Id. at 583.
198. Id. at 580.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 583.
201. Id. (quoting Turman v. Central Billing Bureau, 568 P.2d 1382, 1384 (Or. 1977)); see
also Rockhill v. Pollard, 485 P.2d 29 (Or. 1971) (special relationship found between doctor
and patient); Bodewig v. K-Mart, 635 P.2d 657 (Or. Ct. App. 1981) (special relationship found
between employer and employee), petition denied, 644 P.2d 1128 (Or. 1982); Fitzpatrick v.
Robbins, 626 P.2d 910 (Or. Ct. App.) (special relationship found between landlord and ten-
ant), petition denied, 634 P.2d 1346 (Or. 1981).
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"special relationship" may not have been an absolute requirement for
recovery for outrageous conduct. 20 2 Nonetheless, because at the close of
evidence Julie withdrew the portion of her complaint alleging a special
relationship between her and the defendants, the court found this ele-
ment to be missing.
2 3
The second consideration was whether plaintiff was particularly sus-
ceptible to distress.2 4 In spite of the fact that Julie was seventeen years
old205 and several hundred miles away from home206 when she first be-
came involved with the Church, the court determined that because Julie
did not argue on appeal that "she was in any way particularly susceptible
to the infliction of emotional distress," this consideration was not met.20 7
Finally, the court found that the Church of Scientology's conduct
was not sufficiently outrageous so as to trigger liability for any resultant
severe emotional distress.20 8 In effect, the Church's conduct was not "be-
yond the limits of social toleration.
' 2°9
Ii. Meroni v. Holy Spirit Ass'n for Unification
The court in Meroni v. Holy Spirit Ass'n for Unification 210 held that
not only was the defendant Unification Church's subjection of plaintiff's
son to highly intensive coercive persuasion not tortious, 211 it also was not
sufficiently outrageous conduct to support a claim for IIED.2 2 Because
202. See Christofferson, 644 P.2d at 583 & nn.4-5. The court noted that "Brewer specifi-
cally did not decide whether there could be recovery in a situation in which there was no
special relationship and where only recklessness was shown." Id. at 583 n.4. Furthermore,
the court distinguished Bodewig, stating that "Bodewig involved one party defendant who had
no special relationship to the plaintiff. However, even in that case, some of the acts necessary
to establish the tort were committed only by the employer-defendant, albeit with the other
party defendant's encouragement." Id. at 583 n.5. The court also said that "[t]he character
of the relationship bears on the mental element required to impose liability." Id. at 583 (quot-
ing Hall v. May Dep't Stores, 637 P.2d 126 (Or. 1981)).
203. Id. The court did assert that the issue of special relationship was not reached because
the outrageous conduct claims were disposed of on other grounds. Id. at 583 n.4.
204. Id. at 583; see Turman v. Central Billing Bureau, 568 P.2d 1382, 1384 (Or. 1977)
(plaintiff, blind and suffering from glaucoma, requiring treatment by clinic for which bill was
being collected); Rockhill, 485 P.2d at 29-30 (plaintiff already distraught because of automo-
bile accident and injury to child); Fitzpatrick, 626 P.2d at 913-14 (defendant counter-claimants
aged and visibly disabled).
205. Christofferson, 644 P.2d at 583 n.6.
206. Id. at 580.
207. Id. at 583.
208. Id. at 585.
209. Id. at 590-91.
210. 506 N.Y.S.2d 174 (App. Div. 1986), appeal dismissed, 504 N.E.2d 698 (N.Y. 1987).
211. Id. at 176-77. See supra notes 161-65 and accompanying text for a discussion of this
holding.
212. Id. The court therefore granted the Church's motion to dismiss. Id. at 179. The
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the subjects of the Church's intensive religious proselytizing practices 13
were there voluntarily,214 brainwashing was "not considered by our soci-
ety to be beyond all possible bounds of decency."2 '
The fact that the Unification Church knew that plaintiff's deceased
son "was 'emotionally disturbed' and 'susceptible'" did not change the
court's finding.216 The court explained that this did not make defend-
ant's conduct "any more extreme or outrageous, for it is not uncommon
for those who are confused and depressed to seek guidance from a reli-
gion, and to submit themselves to the dictates of that religion in an effort
to solve their problems.
217
iii. Molko v. Holy Spirit Ass'n for Unification
Unlike the court in Christofferson v. Church of Scientology,218 the
court in Molko v. Holy Spirit Ass'n for Unification 219 found that the de-
fendant Church's conduct, fraudulently inducing plaintiffs into a setting
in which they could be brainwashed,22 could be construed as sufficiently
outrageous conduct so as to trigger liability for plaintiff's extreme emo-
tional disturbances.2 21 Thus, summary judgment for the Church on this
issue was improper.222
The court defined extreme and outrageous conduct to be conduct
"'exceed[ing] all bounds [of decency] usually tolerated by a decent soci-
ety, [and] ... of a nature which is especially calculated to cause, and does
cause, mental distress.' ,223 Conduct may be characterized as outrageous
court assumed that the allegations in plaintiff's amended complaint were true. Id. at 176.
Nonetheless, the Church as a matter of law could not be held liable for intentional infliction of
emotional distress. Id. at 176-77.
213. The plaintiff alleged that defendant Unification Church subjected his deceased son to
"highly programmed behavioral control techniques in a controlled environment thereby nar-
rowing his attention and causing him to go into a trance. He was subjected to an intense
fasting from foods and beverages, a program of chanting and related activities." Id. at 176.
This intense program, which included isolation, intense physical exercise, confessions, lectures
and highly structured work and study schedules, allegedly resulted in plaintiff's son's emo-
tional breakdown, id. at 177, and subsequent suicide, id. at 175.
214. Id. at 177.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. 644 P.2d 577 (Or. Ct. App.), petition denied, 650 P.2d 928 (Or. 1982), cert denied, 459
U.S. 1206 (1983).
219. 46 Cal. 3d 1092, 762 P.2d 46, 252 Cal. Rptr. 122 (1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1084
(1989).
220. See supra notes 171-79 and accompanying text.
221. Molko, 46 Cal. 3d at 1122-23, 762 P.2d at 63, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 139.
222. Id. at 1123, 762 P.2d at 63, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 139.
223. Id. at 1122, 762 P.2d at 63, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 139 (quoting Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire
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when the defendant "'(1) abuses a relation or position which gives [the
defendant] power to damage the plaintiff's interest; (2) [the defendant]
knows the plaintiff is susceptible to injuries through mental distress; or
(3) acts intentionally or unreasonably with the recognition that the acts
are likely to result in illness through mental distress.' "224
The court held that the Church's continued deception could be con-
strued to be conduct "breaching plaintiffs' trust in the integrity of those
who were promising to make their lives more meaningful. ' 225 Thus, the
Church's actions could reasonably be seen as an abuse of a relation or
power and therefore it was a jury question as to whether these actions
were extreme and outrageous.226
iv. George v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness
Plaintiff Robin George sued the International Society for Krishna
Consciousness of California (ISKCON) alleging that ISKCON's coercive
persuasion practices constituted extreme and outrageous conduct.227 At
trial, a jury awarded Robin $250,000 compensatory damages and
$12,250,000 punitive damages for IED.221 Robin argued that this
award was amply supported by the "evidence of [ISKCON's] miscon-
duct toward [her]" as a Krishna devotee.229
In reversing the judgment for IED in favor of Robin, the California
Protection Dist., 43 Cal. 3d 148, 155 n.7, 729 P.2d 743, 747 n.7, 233 Cal. Rptr. 308, 312 n.7
(1987)).
224. Id. (quoting Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Protection Dist., 43 Cal. 3d 148, 155 n.7, 729 P.2d
743, 747 n.7, 233 Cal. Rptr. 308, 312 n.7 (1987)).
225. Id. at 1122, 762 P.2d at 63, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 139.
226. Id. at 1122-23, 762 P.2d at 63, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 139.
227. George v. International Soe'y for Krishna Consciousness, 262 Cal. Rptr. 217, 230-31
(Ct. App. 1989) (depublished opinion), cert denied, 110 S. Ct. 2168 (1990), cert. granted and
vacated, 111 S. Ct. 1299 (1991).
228. Id. at 231. The punitive damages award for intentional infliction of emotional distress
was a joint award to Robin and her mother Marcia. Id. Plaintiffs also were awarded damages
for false imprisonment, wrongful death and libel. Id. The total damages awarded were over
$32 million. Id. The Georges accepted a remittitur, reducing the damages by approximately
$23 million. Id. The court of appeal, however, reversed the damages awarded to Robin for
false imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress and libel. Id. at 259.
229. Id. at 237 n.24. To wit, Robin George argued that as a Krishna devotee:
-Robin was made to work grueling hours with very little in the way of sleep or
sustenance.
-All of her possessions were taken away; she was forced to plead for such common
items as shoes, clothing and health care.
-She was required to do menial labor and forced to beg for money.
-Robin was deprived of any meaningful contact with the outside world. She was
separated from the nurturing influence of family and friends; she was not even al-
lowed to correspond.
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Court of Appeal asserted that defendant's acts were not outrageous; in
fact, they were not uncommon practices among cloistered religious
groups.23 Moreover, Robin's allegations that she was "forced" to do
certain things were not supported by the record, because "there [was] no
evidence [that she] was ever threatened with physical force if she failed
to comply.
231
There was no evidence suggesting that defendants engaged in con-
duct intended to inflict severe emotional distress on Robin, or even in
reckless disregard of that possibility.2 32 "Robin's religious duties and liv-
ing conditions were identical to... other Krishna devotees who volunta-
rily chose [that] lifestyle.
2 33
The court in George then distinguished Molko v. Holy Spirit Ass'n
for Unification,234 which held that the plaintiff did have a claim for
IED 235 because the outrageous conduct in that case was based on the
Church's fraudulent practices.236 In her petition for rehearing, Robin
asserted for the first time that she was fraudulently induced to join the
Krishna movement based on representations that she could not practice
the religion at home. According to the court, however, this claim came
too late to constitute the basis for an outrageous conduct claim.2 37 Thus,
the verdict for Robin George for intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress was reversed.238
c. false imprisonment
False imprisonment has been described as the "nonconsensual, in-
tentional confinement of a person, without lawful privilege, for an appre-
ciable length of time, however short. '239 When a person is "wrongfully
deprived of his freedom to leave a particular place by the conduct of
230. Id. at 237.
231. Id. at 237 n.4. "Apart from the metaphysical question of brainwashing, there was
every objective indication that Robin actively sought defendants' assistance and fully cooper-
ated in their efforts to hide her from her parents." Id.
232. Id. at 237.
233. Id.
234. 46 Cal. 3d 1092, 762 P.2d 46, 252 Cal. Rptr. 122 (1988), cert denied, 490 U.S. 1084
(1989).
235. Id. at 1122-23, 762 P.2d at 63, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 139.
236. George, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 237.
237. See id. at 236.
238. Id. at 221.
239. City of Newport Beach v. Sasse, 9 Cal. App. 3d 803, 810, 88 Cal. Rptr. 476, 480
(1970); see also W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS,
§ 11, at 47 (5th ed. 1984) ("False imprisonment protects the personal interest in freedom of
movement.").
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another," that person is falsely imprisoned. 2"
Coercive persuasion or brainwashing has been asserted to show that
the plaintiff did not voluntarily consent to confinement. 241 Although
false imprisonment may "be effected by... fraud, or deceit,"'242 many
courts require that a plaintiff be held involuntarily by physical force243 or
by threat of force.2' No courts have held that brainwashing alone is
sufficient to vitiate a plaintiff's "consent to confinement." Nevertheless,
plaintiffs have asserted false imprisonment in two religious cult cases.
i. Molko v. Holy Spirit Ass'n for Unification
In Molko v. Holy Spirit Ass'n for Unification245 plaintiff Leal246 con-
tended that she was falsely imprisoned at the Unification Church's Boon-
ville, Camp K, Boulder, Los Angeles and San Francisco centers.247
According to Leal, her imprisonment did not stem from immediate phys-
ical restraint, immediate threat of physical force or immediate subjective
fear of physical force.248 Instead, her confinement was caused by fear of
the future harm that would come to her family if she left the commu-
nity.249 Specifically, she was led to believe that her family "'would be
damned in Hell forever and they would forever feel sorry for having
blown their one chance to unite with the Messiah and make it to
240. Schanafelt v. Seaboard Fin. Co., 108 Cal. App. 2d 420, 422-23, 239 P.2d 42, 43 (1951).
241. See infra notes 245-52 and accompanying text for a discussion of the false imprison-
ment claim in Molko v. Holy Spirit Ass'n for Unification, 46 Cal. 3d 1092, 762 P.2d 46, 252
Cal. Rptr. 122 (1988), cert denied, 490 U.S. 1084 (1989), and infra notes 253-73 and accompa-
nying text for a discussion of the false imprisonment claim in George v. International Soc'y for
Krishna Consciousness, 262 Cal. Rptr. 217 (Ct. App. 1989) (depublished opinion), cert. de-
nied, 110 S. Ct. 2168 (1990), cert. granted and vacated, 111 S. Ct. 1299 (1991).
242. CAL. PENAL CODE § 237 (West 1988); see People v. Rios, 177 Cal. App. 3d 445, 450,
222 Cal. Rptr. 913, 916 (1986).
243. St. Louis, I. Mtn. & So. R.R. v. Wilson, 66 S.W. 661, 663 (Ark. 1902); Reese v. Julia
Sport Wear, 21 N.Y.S.2d 99, 100-01 (App. Div. 1940); Salisbury v. Poulson, 172 P. 315, 317
(Utah 1918); see also KEETON et al., supra note 239, § 11, at 49 ("restraint may be made by
means of physical barriers").
244. George, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 231; People v. Haney, 75 Cal. App. 3d 308, 313, 142 Cal.
Rptr. 186, 189 (1977); Parrott v. Bank of America, 97 Cal. App. 2d 14, 23, 217 P.2d 89, 94-95
(1950); Mahan v. Adam, 124 A. 901, 904-05 (Md. 1924); see also KEETON et al., supra note
239, § 11, at 49 & nn.29-30 (stating that restraint may be "by threats of force which intimidate
plaintiff into compliance....").
245. 46 Cal. 3d 1092, 762 P.2d 46, 252 Cal. Rptr. 122 (1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1084
(1989).
246. See supra notes 171-76 and accompanying text for a discussion of the facts of the
Molko case.
247. These were the locations Tracy Leal visited while an indoctrinee and convert of the
Unification Church. Molko, 46 Cal. 3d at 1123, 762 P.2d at 64, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 140.
248. Id.
249. Id.
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Heaven.' "250
The court found that this threat was not sufficient to establish false
imprisonment.25' Indeed, as a threat of divine retribution, it was consti-
tutionally protected religious speech.252
ii. George v. International Society of Krishna Consciousness
In George v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness
(ISKCON),253 plaintiff Robin George became a Krishna devotee when
she was fifteen years old.254 The president of the Laguna Beach Hare
Krishna temple, defendant Roy Christopher Richard ("Rsabadeva") told
Robin that she could not live at home and practice her religion and sug-
gested that she run away from her parents. 255 "Leave home," Rsabadeva
said, "and we will send you someplace where your parents will never find
you."25 6
When Robin ran away two weeks later,257 Rsabadeva made good on
his promise. For almost a year Robin was sent away to different temples
in California, Canada, New York and Louisiana.25 The Krishnas also
engaged in a series of ruses to hide Robin from her parents, including
disguising her,259 denying they knew where she was2 ° and sending false
letters from Robin to her parents.261 Finally, after Robin's parents ex-
erted legal pressure on the Krishnas and threatened criminal prosecu-
tion,262 Robin returned to her parents.263
In her claim for false imprisonment, Robin asserted that although
she was never physically restrained by the defendants, 26 she was brain-
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 1123-24, 762 P.2d at 64, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 140; see also Fowler v. Rhode Island,
345 U.S. 67, 70 (1953) (holding religious sermon by Jehovah's Witness in park to be
protected).
253. 262 Cal. Rptr. 217 (Ct. App. 1989) (depublished opinion), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2168
(1990), cert. granted and vacated, 111 S. Ct. 1299 (1991).
254. Id. at 223.
255. Id. at 222.
256. Id. at 222-23.
257. Id. at 223.
258. Id. at 223-29.
259. Id. at 225-26, 228.
260. Id. at 224, 226.
261. In these letters, Robin asserted she had left the Krishnas and "was traveling with a
group of musicians in Mexico." Id. at 227. The letters were mailed from Mexico when Robin
was actually in Canada. Id. at 228.
262. Id. at 228-29.
263. Id. at 229.
264. Id. at 231.
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washed into joining the Krishna movement. 26" Robin's will had not been
overcome by violent means, but by the coercive practices of the Krishna
movement. 266 Thus, she was held without her consent.
261
The California Court of Appeal did not accept this claim2 68 and
overturned the lower court's award of damages for false imprison-
ment.269 The court discussed Molko v. Holy Spirit Ass'n for Unifica-
tion 270 and concluded that as Molko had found that imposing tort
liability for threats of divine retribution was unconstitutional, so too
"[t]ort liability based on dietary restrictions, methods of worship and
communal living arrangements and schedules is just as surely inimical to
the free exercise of religious liberty as that based on threats of divine
retribution."
271
Furthermore, as Robin failed to suggest that the schedules, practices
and duties required of her differed from those of any other disciple, she
could not premise her "brainwashing theory of false imprisonment... on
religious practices the Georges [found] objectionable. '272 Such tort lia-
bility would violate the First Amendment guarantee of the free exercise
of religion.273
IV. ANALYSIS
A. L-TCP in Undue Influence
The doctrine of undue influence arises when a party seeks to revoke
a gift because the donor's will was overcome by the recipient who ex-
265. Id. at 232. Robin introduced the expert testimony of Drs. Margaret Singer and Syd-
ney Smith to support this assertion. Id. Dr. Singer testified that Robin's "will had been over-
borne" such that her decision to run away from home was not a product of her own free will.
Id. Both Dr. Singer and Dr. Smith argued that several features of the Krishna faith contrib-
uted to rendering Robin incapable of exercising freedom of choice: the movement's low-carbo-
hydrate vegetarian diet, reduced amounts of sleep and chanting as a means of religious ritual.
Id.
266. Id. at 235.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 236.
269. Id. at 259.
270. 46 Cal. 3d 1092, 762 P.2d 46, 252 Cal. Rptr. 122 (1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1084
(1989).
271. George, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 236. The court supported this by citing dicta in which the
Molko court, in concluding that religious fraud is actionable, stated that "[a]lthough fasting,
poverty, silence or cloistered living may constitute intensive religious practice, we have already
determined that fraud, even though purported to be religiously motivated, is actionable con-
duct." Id, (citing Molko v. Holy Spirit Ass'n for Unification, 46 Cal. 3d 1092, 1122, 762 P.2d
46, 63, 252 Cal. Rptr. 122, 139 (1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1084 (1989)).
272. Id
273. Id.
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ploited a confidential relationship.274 Undue influence in the context of a
gift to a cleric, spiritual adviser or church contains the five elements of L-
TCP discussed above.275
1. Common elements of L-TCP
The first element of L-TCP is a long-term pattern of influence,
which is viewed in two ways: (1) as contrasted with the short-term coer-
cion of physical duress;276 and (2) the length of time the minister or spiri-
tual adviser spends with the donor.2 77 Short-term physical duress is an
immediate pressure applied to an actor to perform an act.278 Alterna-
tively, long-term persuasion is characterized by constant pressure applied
over a period of time.279
The second common element is that the long-term pattern of influ-
ence be exerted by a stronger personality or presence that purports to
care about the interests of the weaker party.280 In undue influence in the
context of inter vivos gifts to religious or spiritual advisers, the stronger
personality may arise in several contexts. First, in the eyes of adherents
to a faith, a minister is likely to be construed as a spiritual authority of
that faith, either because he or she is guided by a higher authority or
because he or she is more educated in the tenets or belief systems of that
faith. Also, a spiritual or religious adviser "ministers"28 1 to believers.
Therefore, a minister is construed to have a confidential relationship with
274. See The Bible Speaks v. Dovydenas, 81 B.R. 750, 760 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1988), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part, 869 F.2d 628 (Bankr. 1st Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 816 (1989); Held v.
Florida Conference Ass'n of Seventh Day Adventists, 193 So. 828, 831-33 (Fla. 1940); Nelson
v. Dodge, 68 A.2d 51, 57 (R.I. 1949); Morley v. Loughnan, 1 Ch. 736, 752 (Eng. 1893);
Allcard v. Skinner, 36 Ch. D. 145, 157-58 (Eng. 1887); Nottidge v. Prince, 2 Giff. 246, 267-70,
66 Eng. Rep. 103, 112-13 (1860); Norton v. Relly, 2 Eden 286, 288-89, 28 Eng. Rep. 908, 908-
09 (1764).
275. See supra note 17.
276. See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
277. See Patrinelis, supra note 65, at 657-59 (requirement of fiduciary relationship).
278. For example, if Sally holds a gun to Joe's head and asks him to sign over the deed to
his house to her, Joe would be responding to the immediate pressure to do the act induced by
Sally's physical threat.
279. Using the example from note 278, Sally might induce Joe to sign over the deed to his
house to her, by telling him that she was the only one who cared for him in his last illness, that
her ministry could do many wonderful things with Joe's house, and that Joe's daughter would
be damned to Hell forever if Joe did not give his house to Sally. Joe would not be responding
to an immediate pressure of violence if he signed over his house. Instead, Sally's constant,
long-term influence would cause him to do so.
280. The "stronger" personality is stronger relative to the influenced personality.
281. To "minister" is defined as "to attend to the wants and comforts of someone." WEB-
sTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1439 (1976).
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the donor and thus care about the donor.282
Third, the influenced personality is emotionally or mentally vulnera-
ble.283 In undue influence the influenced personality or donor may be
vulnerable due to inherent traits, such as illness, 28 4 age2 85 or mental
deficiency.286
Fourth, the stronger personality exploits its position of trust or
power to further its own interests.287 In undue influence, when a spiri-
tual or religious adviser, who purportedly puts the spiritual or emotional
interests of the donor ahead of his or her own interest, receives a gift
from the donor, there is a presumption that this exploitation has
occurred.
288
Finally, this exploitation harms the more vulnerable personality.28 9
The harm arises in undue influence cases because it is presumed that
without the minister's influence, the donor would have done something
different with the property (either keep the property or give it to someone
else).290 Thus, the donor loses not only a property interest when undue
influence is exerted, but also the attached right of alienation, or the right
to do with the property as he or she sees fit.291 In effect, the donor's will
is overcome by the undue influence. It is this unfair exploitation which
offends basic notions of freedom and fairness.2 92
282. See Connor v. Stanley, 72 Cal. 556, 558-59, 14 P. 306, 307 (1887); see also Cox v.
Schnerr, 172 Cal. 371, 378, 156 P. 509, 513 (1916) (recognizing that "attorneys, physicians,
trustees, clergymen, kinsmen" have "formal relation of trust to those with whom they deal");
Ross v. Conway, 92 Cal. 632, 635-37, 28 P. 785, 786 (1892) (holding that relationship between
donee and priest was confidential relationship in which priest should not take advantage of
parishioner).
283. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
284. See Gilmore v. Lee, 86 N.E. 568, 570-71 (I1. 1908) (gift causa mortis); McPherson v.
Byrne, 118 N.W. 985, 985 (Mich. 1909) (same).
285. See Dowie v. Driscoll, 68 N.E. 56, 56 (Ill. 1903) (action to set aside transfer of trust
deed and promissory note by eighty-seven-year-old donee); Good v. Zook, 88 N.W. 376, 377
(Iowa 1901) (action to set aside transfer of property to church by ninety-year-old widower).
286. See The Bible Speaks v. Dovydenas, 81 B.R. 750, 752-53 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1988) (do-
nor sought return of monetary gifts totalling six million dollars), aff'd in part, rev'd in part,
869 F.2d 628 (Bankr. 1st Cir.) (reversing rescission of $80,000 and $1,000,000 in gifts but
affirming rescission of $5,000,000 gift), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 816 (1989); Morley v. Loughnan,
1 Ch. 736, 740-41 (Eng. 1893) (epileptic donor subject to momentary attacks of loss of con-
sciousness and nearly total loss of memory).
287. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
288. See supra notes 64-83 and accompanying text.
289. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
290. See Patrinelis, supra note 65, at 655-56.
291. Id.
292. See supra notes 64-95 and accompanying text.
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2. Interests protected by the doctrine of undue influence
Whenever a legal theory determines that certain rights or interests
are to prevail over others, that theory is either balancing or deciding the
importance of the rights of the parties in the suit,2 93 affected parties
outside the suit294 or societal interests.
295
In undue influence the parties in the suit are typically the donor or
family of the unduly influenced donor,2 96 the more vulnerable personal-
ity, and the donee,297 the stronger personality. The more vulnerable per-
sonality is favored at the expense of the stronger personality because
under the presumption model,298 the presumption of undue influence is
given to the more vulnerable personality.29 9 The susceptibility model
also focuses on the more vulnerable personality. 3°°
In undue influence the more vulnerable personality's interests are
identical to the harms caused by undue influence: the donor's interest in
property and the donor's autonomy interest in the ability to make
choices of alienation of that property without being misled or influenced
by a stronger personality.30 1 In fact, the doctrine of undue influence at-
tempts to balance the power of a stronger personality over a weaker per-
sonality by increasing the presumption when the donor is particularly
susceptible.30 2
The families of donors are often affected by the unduly influenced
gift because in many cases, if not for the unduly influenced transfer, they
would receive the natural bounty of the donor's affection.303 Thus, fam-
ily members often bring suit against the donee to have the gift revoked
for undue influence.3°4 The doctrine of undue influence protects the fam-
ily's interest by strengthening the presumption of undue influence when-
293. LIEF H. CARTER, REASON IN LAW 13-14 (1988).
294. Id.
295. Id
296. See, eg., The Bible Speaks v. Dovydenas, 81 B.R. 750, 752-53 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1988)
(donor sought return of monetary gifts), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 869 F.2d 628 (Bankr. 1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 816 (1989); Gilmore v. Lee, 86 N.E. 568, 569 (11. 1908) (daughter
successful in revoking gift to priest by her dying mother); McClellan v. Grant, 82 N.Y.S. 208,
209 (App. Div. 1903) (son brought suit to revoke deed from mother to pastor).
297. See, eg., The Bible Speaks, 81 B.R. at 752-53 (donor sought return of monetary gift
made to pastor).
298. See supra notes 64-83 and accompanying text.
299. See supra notes 64-83 and accompanying text.
300. See supra notes 92-95 and accompanying text.
301. Patrinelis, supra note 65, at 655-56.
302. The donor is deemed particularly vulnerable when he or she is aged, mentally weak, in
last sickness or a religious "fanatic." See supra notes 71-78 and accompanying text.
303. See Patrinelis, supra note 65, at 677-78.
304. See, e-g., Gilmore v. Lee, 86 N.E. 568, 569 (Ill. 1908) (daughter successful in revoking
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ever the donor, in an inter vivos gift to a religious adviser, fails to provide
for his or her family."'
Finally, the doctrine of undue influence protects the societal inter-
ests in family stability,3" 6 trust in our clergy3"7 and societal economic
interests.30 8 Thus, the proof requirements of undue influence adequately
balance and protect the personal interests of the parties, the affected non-
parties and societal interests.
B. L-TCP in Involuntary Servitude
A powerful group or individual can subject a less powerful individ-
ual, such as a child3 9 or a retarded individual with the mental capacity
of a child,310 to involuntary servitude. To successfully prosecute an in-
voluntary servitude offense under the majority's decision in United States
v. Kozminski,31 ' the government must show that the enslaved person was
held in the state of servitude by virtue of a physical threat.31 2 Psycholog-
ical coercion is not sufficient.31 3 This physical threat requirement is non-
sensical because involuntary servitude, like undue influence, is often the
result of L-TCP.31 4
Nor does Justice Brennan's concurrence in Kozminski adequately
address the problem. 31  His proposal-that the court should focus on
the "slavelike conditions" of the victim-looks to the result rather than
the enslaver's actions.31 6 These conditions are not clearly defined be-
gift to priest by her dying mother); McClellan v. Grant, 82 N.Y.S. 208, 209 (App. Div. 1903)
(son brought suit to revoke deed from mother to pastor).
305. See Ford v. Hennessy, 709 Mo. 580, 592 (1879) (presumption of undue influence in-
creased where priest received money from dying donor when priest had heard that donor had
wife).
306. By protecting family property from undue influence of outsiders, the family unit is
more stable. See Patrinelis, supra note 65, at 677.
307. By discouraging clergy from accepting gifts from their parishioners, the undue influ-
ence model thereby secures the image of the clergy as being spiritual advisers above all. See id.
at 657-58.
308. By attempting to keep the property "in the family," the social costs of supporting
possibly destitute relatives is reduced. See id. at 677-78.
309. See, eg., United States v. King, 840 F.2d 1276 (6th Cir.) (en bane) (young boy), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 894 (1988).
310. See, e.g., United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931 (1988) (mentally retarded farm
workers found working for no salary on isolated farm).
311. Id.
312. Id. at 952.
313. See id.
314. See supra notes 132-35 and accompanying text where five elements of L-TCP are
shown in involuntary servitude.
315. Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 956 (Brennan, J., concurring).
316. Id. at 961-65 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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cause they work backwards from the result to track the intentional con-
duct of the enslaver. "Slavelike conditions" is an ambiguous term and
many different situations could meet this definition. Thus, one court
could conceivably find that a defendant employed a person as a slave,
because the victim worked long hours and was underpaid; yet another
court would find involuntary servitude only when the victim worked long
hours, received no compensation and was housed in substandard
housing.
Justice Stevens's case-by-case, 17 "totality of circumstances ' 318 ap-
proach is not helpful either. Because Justice Stevens does not articulate
which circumstances should be analyzed in which cases, this approach
effectively offers no guidelines for courts trying to define involuntary
servitude.
1. Common elements of L-TCP in involuntary servitude
The first element common to both L-TCP and involuntary servitude
is a long-term pattern of influence which can be viewed in two ways.
Long-term influence must be contrasted initially with the short-term co-
ercion of physical duress, as in undue influence.319 Under short-term
physical duress, an actor is given the immediate choice of performing a
specific act or facing a violent consequence.32° Furthermore, because
"servitude" is a "condition of having to work for others and having no
freedom, ' 32 1 it is not limited to performing one specific act. Rather, as
documented by the plight of the victims in United States v. Kozminski,322
United States v. King 32 3 and the padrone victims, 324 involuntary servi-
tude is a result of a long-term system of persuasion that leaves victims
powerless to do anything but obey their masters' commands.325
The second common element, "a stronger personality or presence
purportedly acting in the best interests of a less powerful personality,
326
can be found in many involuntary servitude cases.327
317. Id. at 965-66 (Stevens, J., concurring).
318. Id. at 970 (Stevens, J., concurring).
319. See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
320. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
321. OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY 831 (1st ed. 1982) (emphasis added).
322. 487 U.S. 931 (1988).
323. 840 F.2d 1276 (6th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 894 (1988).
324. See Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 946-49 (discussing plight of child victims under padrone
system).
325. See, e.g., id. at 934-45 (mentally retarded victims rendered powerless by being iso-
lated, denied adequate food, shelter and medical care).
326. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
327. For example, in Kozminski the defendants found one of the victims living on the
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The third common element that involuntary servitude shares with
other forms of L-TCP is that the victim be emotionally or mentally more
vulnerable.328 All three involuntary servitude cases involved either chil-
dren 29 or retarded adults.33
The fourth common element of exploitation is shown by the crime
itself: the victims are forced into a state of slavery and denied
freedom.
3 31
The fifth common element of "causing harm to the more vulnerable
party" stems not only from the loss of freedom, but from the additional
abuse the victims suffered. In Kozminski the victims were denied ade-
quate health care and nutrition and lived in squalor.33 2 One victim in
King was a child beaten to death for a violation of an order to work. 33
Similar conditions existed under the padrone system.
3 34
2. Interests asserted under the doctrine of involuntary servitude
The main interest protected by the criminal laws against involuntary
servitude is the victim's liberty interest-to be free from slavery.335 The
streets of Ann Arbor and offered him employment at their farm so that the victim could avoid
institutionalization. Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 935. In King the defendants who enslaved the
children were the adult spiritual leaders who ran the religious camp. King, 840 F.2d at 1278-
79. In fact, the defendants strengthened their authority by beating the children's parents in
front of them so that the children would see that their parents' authority or strength was no
match for the religious leaders. Id. at 1280. Under the padrone system, the defendants were
the adults who had offered the boys' parents money so that they could bring the children to
America. See Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 946-49 (discussing plight of child victims under padrone
system).
328. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
329. E.g., King, 840 F.2d at 1278. See Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 946-49 for a discussion of
the padrone system.
330. See, eg., Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 934.
331. See id at 935; King, 840 F.2d at 1280-81.
332. Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 934-35.
333. See King, 840 F.2d at 1280.
334. See Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 945-48, 957-58 (discussing padrone system and reason for
adapting statute).
335. U.S. CONST. amend. XIIL The long history of the involuntary servitude statute, 18
U.S.C. § 1584 (1988), illustrates our societal condemnation of this crime. Section 1584 dates
from 1948, 62 Stat. 773, and represents a consolidation of two older statutes. See 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 1585 reviser's notes (West 1984). The first statute, the Act of April 20, 1918, ch. 91, § 6, 3
Stat. 452, later Rev. Stat. § 5377, § 248 of the Criminal Code of 1909, 35 Stat. 1139, and 18
U.S.C. § 423 (1940), penalized any "person who brings within the jurisdiction of the United
States... any person of color... as a slave, or to be held to service or labor." United States v.
Shackney, 333 F.2d 475, 481 (2d Cir. 1964). The second statute, the Act of June 23, 1874, 18
Stat. 251, was "an act to protect persons of foreign birth against forcible constraint or involun-
tary servitude." Shackney, 333 F.2d at 482. This statute was known as the Padrone statute
and was aimed at abusive practices against Italian children brought into the United States to
perform as street musicians. Id.
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defendant's interests are the constitutional protections accorded any per-
son accused of a crime.
3 36
Unlike undue influence cases, in which the donor's family may bring
suit to recover a rightful inheritance,337 involuntary servitude cases
rarely involve anyone but the government, the criminal defendant and
the victim. 338 Thus, there are rarely any affected non-parties in an invol-
untary servitude case whose interests need to be protected. Our societal
interest in making involuntary servitude illegal is a combination of the
victim's interest in freedom from slavery and society's moral condemna-
tion of this conduct.339
Interpreting the laws to require physical duress as an element of
involuntary servitude favors the defendant. By requiring the prosecutor
to show that the defendant threatened the victim with violence or legal
action to prove a charge of involuntary servitude, a victim who could not
prove physical threats were used may nonetheless be enslaved by other
methods and yet denied protection through the legal system.3' ° Adher-
ing to this higher burden of proof may pose a difficult, if not insurmount-
able, barrier to proving involuntary servitude.341
For example, using the facts of United States v. Kozminski,3 42 as-
sume that in lieu of physical threats, the retarded, isolated victims were
denied food if they did not work for defendants. Denying food is tradi-
336. For example, the defendant is protected by: U.S. CONST. amend. IV (right to be free
from unreasonable search and seizure); id. amend. V (right to due process); id. amend. VI
(right to counsel, confrontation, jury and speedy trial); and id. amend. VIII (right to be free
from excessive bail as well as cruel and unusual punishment).
337. See supra notes 303-05 and accompanying text.
338. See, eg., Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 934 (government brought criminal charges against
farm owners where government found two enslaved farm workers on defendants' farm).
339. American society's long-term condemnation of slavery is reflected in the Thirteenth
Amendment, which provides: "Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punish-
ment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United
States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction." U.S. CONsT. amend. XIII. The Northwest
Ordinance of 1787 also contained language barring slavery and involuntary servitude: "There
shall be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude in the said territory otherwise than in pun-
ishment of crimes... ." Northwest Ordinance, Art. VI, 33 Journals of Continental Congress
343 (1787).
340. See, for example, supra note 111, which describes the original jury instruction in
Kozminski that would have allowed a psychological model of duress to be sufficient to prove
involuntary servitude. Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 937-38.
341. Unless there are witnesses, the issue of whether a physical or legal threat was used may
turn on the testimony of the victim, who will assert that a physical threat was made, versus the
defendant's testimony, who will assert that no violence or legal action was threatened. Even if
the defendant does not testify, the standard to prove the criminal charge of involuntary servi-
tude is "proof-beyond a reasonable doubt."
342. 487 U.S. 931 (1988); supra notes 100-10 and accompanying text.
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tionally not construed as a physical threat;343 nonetheless, without food,
one cannot survive. Yet, under the Kozminski test, although the victims
would be forced to work against their will, their enslavers could not be
criminally prosecuted. 3"
Second, our interest in propounding involuntary servitude laws is
based on the societal moral fabric of protecting vulnerable people.
345
The physical duress requirement set forth in Kozminski 34 does not ade-
quately protect these people, especially when the victim, due to age,
mental condition or isolation, is weaker than the enslaver. In fact, a
physical duress model focuses more on what would make "the reasonable
person" agree to work without pay.347 The victims in Kozminski, King
343. Physical threats, at least under the traditional physical duress defense, are normally
threats of imminent death or great bodily harm. Although denying a victim food if he or she
does not work would eventually cause starvation, which is a form of bodily harm, there is
nonetheless no imminence in a threat to deprive a victim of food.
344. Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 952.
345. There are many general laws that protect vulnerable people. See, e.g., CAL. CIV.
CODE §§ 33-42 (West 1982 & Supp. 1991) (addressing legal status and protection of minors
and incompetents); CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1301-12 (West 1982 & Supp. 1991) (prohibiting em-
ployment of minors).
As to involuntary servitude, one of the earliest statutes enacted by Congress was the Act
of June 23, 1874, known as the Padrone Statute. Act of June 23, 1874, ch. 464, § 1, 18 Stat.
251. The Padrone statute provided in pertinent part "[t]hat whoever shall knowingly and
wilfully bring into the United States... any person.., with intent to hold such person... in
confinement or to any involuntary service... shall be deemed guilty of a felony." This Act
was specifically aimed at curtailing the system of importing and selling the labor of Italian
children in the United States. United States v. Shackney, 333 F.2d 475, 485 (2d Cir. 1964).
346. 487 U.S. at 952.
347. The physical duress model may be compared to the criminal defense of duress. Under
the defense of duress:
A person's unlawful threat [is one] (1).which causes the defendant reasonably to
believe that the only way to avoid imminent death or serious bodily injury to himself
or to another is to engage in conduct which violates the literal terms of the criminal
law, and (2) which causes the defendant to engage in that conduct, gives the defend-
ant the defense of duress.
LAFAvE & Scor, supra note 16, § 5.3, at 432-44 & n.2. The rationale behind the defense of
duress is that the defendant's conduct, which violates the literal language of the criminal law,
is justified because he or she has thereby avoided a harm of greater magnitude. Id. at 433 &
n.6.
This defense has several limitations, which are implicitly based on the factors that would
overcome a reasonable person's will and make him or her perform the crime rather than incur
the threatened harm: (1) duress can never justify the intentional killing of an innocent third
person; (2) threatened future harm will not suffice; (3) threatened immediate nonserious harm
will not suffice; (4) threats creating an unreasonable fear of harm will not suffice; and (5) the
defendant may lose his or her defense of duress if he or she does not take advantage of a
reasonable opportunity to escape, if escape is possible without exposing himself or herself to
death or serious bodily harm. Id. at 434-47.
Both common law and the Model Penal Code endorse the "reasonableness" standard.
The threatening conduct must be "sufficient to create in the mind of a reasonable person the
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and under the padrone system should not be held to the same standard as
"reasonable people" in deciding whether to submit to the will of the en-
slaver because as mentally retarded men 348 and as children,349 they are
different from, and more vulnerable than, "reasonable people."
Finally, requiring a threat of violence to overcome one's will is more
consistent with short-term physical duress350 because even if one is en-
slaved by threat of physical force, the question is when the threat begins
and ends. In the Kozminski case, for example, would it be sufficient if
the Kozminskis had told the victims "should you try to run away, we
will beat you" and then never showed any other sign of violence? Would
it make a difference if the victims were physically bigger than their cap-
tors? In short, a physical threat requirement is just a start into the in-
quiry of which of the defendant's acts was sufficient to enslave the victim.
C. L-TCP in Brainwashing by Religious Cults
The indoctrination process by which religious cults obtain conver-
sion, including coercive persuasion, is not tortious per se.351 Subject to
constitutional First Amendment considerations,352 the indoctrination or
brainwashing process is an element of different types of torts brought by
ex-members against the cult. Brainwashing has been an element of
fraud,35 3 intentional infliction of emotional distress354 and false imprison-
ment claims.35 5 These torts have differing standards of proof.
3 6
fear of death or serious bodily harm." People v. Luther, 232 N.W.2d 184, 187 (Mich. 1975)
(emphasis added). The Model Penal Code also uses a measure of reasonableness to determine
whether a duress defense is justified; under this proposed statute, one who is unlawfully
threatened by another is justified in committing what would otherwise be a crime if the threat
which compels him or her to commit it is such that a person of reasonable firmness in his or
her situation would have been unable to resist it. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09(1).
The Supreme Court in United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931 (1988), rejected the
government's assertion that involuntary servitude included compulsion by any means that
could overcome the victim's will or deprive the victim of the power of choice because: (1) such
a standard could criminalize a wide range of activity; and (2) the prohibited behavior would
depend entirely on the subjective factor of the victim's state of mind. Id. at 949. Thus, it is
conceivable that the Supreme Court adopted the physical duress standard because the Court
believed that physical duress is an objective standard and that such duress would reasonably be
likely to overcome any individual's will.
348. Kozrninski, 487 U.S. at 934.
349. United States v. King, 840 F.2d 1276, 1276 (6th Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 488 U.S.
894 (1988).
350. See supra notes 16, 347 and accompanying text.
351. See supra notes 154-68 and accompanying text.
352. See supra notes 141-53 and accompanying text.
353. See supra notes 171-79 and accompanying text.
354. See supra notes 188-238 and accompanying text.
355. See supra notes 239-73 and accompanying text.
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Brainwashing by religious cults nonetheless shares the five common
elements of coercive persuasion found in undue influence and involun-
tary servitude.
1. Common elements of L-TCP and brainwashing by religious cults
As in undue influence and involuntary servitude, brainwashing is
characterized by a long-term pattern of influence.35 7 The influence of a
religious group over a convert is usually long-term as contrasted with
short-term immediate physical duress.358 For example, plaintiffs were
under defendants' religious cult influence for times varying from several
days in Molko v. Holy Spirit Ass'n for Unification 3-9 to more than a year
in George v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness.
In these cases, the religious group is the stronger personality pur-
porting to care about the best interests of the influenced personality. In
Molko both plaintiffs were initially told that the Unification Church was
an international society of concerned citizens.361 Later Leal was told
that if she did not continue on with the Unification Church her family
"would be damned in Hell forever and they would forever feel sorry for
having blown their one chance to unite with the Messiah and make it to
Heaven. 362 The plaintiff in Christofferson v. Church of Scientology
363
sought to improve herself by enrolling in the Scientology communica-
tions courses364 and was promised a method for relieving her communi-
cation problems. 65 Similarly, in George, Robin George was encouraged
to run away and join the Krishnas to avoid the "karmic doom" that
would befall her if she continued to live with her sinful, meat-eating par-
356. See supra notes 171-273 and accompanying text.
357. See supra notes 276-92, 319-34 and accompanying text for a discussion of the L-TCP
elements for undue influence and involuntary servitude.
358. See supra notes 15-17, 347 and accompanying text.
359. 46 Cal. 3d 1092, 1104, 762 P.2d 46, 51, 252 Cal. Rptr. 122, 127 (1988) (plaintiff Molko
subjected to influence of Unification Church for 12 days prior to being told Church's identity),
cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1084 (1989); id. at 1106, 762 P.2d at 52, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 128 (plaintiff
Leal subjected to 22 days of exercise-lecture-discussion regimen before group informed her it
was affiliated with Unification Church).
360. 262 Cal. Rptr. 217 (Ct. App. 1989) (depublished opinion), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2168
(1990), cert. granted and vacated, 111 S. Ct. 1299 (1991). Robin George became involved with
the Hare Krishnas in July 1974, ran away from home to live with the Krishnas on November
15, 1974 and returned home to her family on November 4, 1975. Id. at 222-29.
361. Molko, 46 Cal. 3d at 1102-05, 762 P.2d at 50-52, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 126-28.
362. Id. at 1123, 762 P.2d at 64, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 140.
363. 644 P.2d 577 (Or. Ct. App.), petition denied, 650 P.2d 928 (Or. 1982), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1206 (1983).
364. See id. at 585.
365. Id. at 587.
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ents (who, according to the cult, were not her actual parents).366 In these
cases, it is clear that the religious groups were stronger parties purporting
to watch out for the best interests of their followers.
In all these cases, the plaintiffs were emotionally or mentally vulner-
able due to their age,367 the period in their lives36 or their preexisting
mental condition. 69 Furthermore, the indoctrination procedures ren-
dered the plaintiffs more vulnerable. By subjecting the Molko plaintiffs
to the intense exercise-lecture-discussion regimen, with little time for rest
or self-reflection, Molko and Leal were weakened by the program.370
Similarly, as a fifteen-year-old girl working long hours and isolated from
her family and friends, the plaintiff in George 371 was highly susceptible to
the religion's influence.372
The more powerful religious groups exploited their followers.
Robin George was sent out into the streets to beg for the Hare
Krishnas.373 Leal sold flowers by the side of the road for the Unification
Church.374 Christofferson was taught how to beg and borrow money
from relatives so that she could take courses that she could not afford.375
Finally, by losing contact with their friends and families,3 76 working
long hours with little sleep or sustenance,377 and in many cases losing
their ability to think independently of their pre-programmed religious
cultish responses,378 the more vulnerable plaintiffs were harmed by their
366. George v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 262 Cal. Rptr. 217, 222 (Ct.
App. 1989) (depublished opinion), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2168 (1990), cert granted and va-
cated, 111 S. Ct. 1299 (1991).
367. See id. at 221 (victim was only 14 years old when she joined Krishna cult).
368. See Molko v. Holy Spirit Ass'n for Unification, 46 Cal. 3d 1092, 1102, 1105, 762 P.2d
46, 49, 52, 252 Cal. Rptr. 122, 125, 128 (1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1084 (1989); Christoffer-
son, 644 P.2d at 580.
369. Meroni v. Holy Spirit Ass'n for Unification, 506 N.Y.S.2d 174, 177 (App. Div. 1986),
appeal dismissed, 504 N.E.2d 698 (N.Y. 1987).
370. Molko, 46 Cal. 3d at 1102-06, 762 P.2d at 50-52, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 126-28.
371. George, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 222-29.
372. RONALD M. ENROTH & J. GORDON MELTON, WHY CULTS SUCCEED WHERE THE
CHURCH FAILS 60 (1985) (discussing religious cults' emphasis in recruiting young people near
"university campuses and in the young adult-singles-high-school-dropout communities... out
there where people are hurting.").
373. George, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 224.
374. Molko, 46 Cal. 3d at 1106, 762 P.2d at 52, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 128.
375. Christofferson v. Church of Scientology, 644 P.2d 577, 587 (Or. Ct. App.), petition
denied, 650 P.2d 928 (Or. 1982), cert denied, 459 U.S. 1206 (1983).
376. The Molko plaintiffs, for example, were brought to the Unification Church retreat
Boonville, which is several hours north of San Francisco. Molko, 46 Cal. 3d at 1103, 1106, 762
P.2d at 50, 52, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 126, 128.
377. See supra note 229 in which Robin George in her suit for intentional infliction of
emotional distress described the conditions under which she was held by the Krishnas.
378. See Delgado, Religious Totalism, supra note 9, at 21-22 & n.130.
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exploitation.
2. Proof requirements for brainwashing by religious cults
Brainwashing is not a tort, but is instead used as an element of many
torts asserted against religious organizations.379 The court in Molko v.
Holy Spirit Ass'n for Unification 380 accepted a psychological model of
brainwashing, as proof of justifiable reliance, to allow a fraud claim to
survive a summary judgment motion.381
In IIED cases, coercive persuasion was held to constitute extreme
and outrageous conduct, although the definitions of outrageous conduct
varied. In Christofferson v. Church of Scientology 312 the plaintiff asserted
that Scientology's indoctrination program met the outrageous conduct
test of "an abuse by the actor of a position, or a relation with the other,
which gives him actual or apparent authority over the other, or power to
affect his interests. '3 3 The court also examined plaintiff's susceptibility
to distress.3 84
The court in Meroni v. Holy Spirit Ass'n for Unification 385 defined
extreme and outrageous conduct as that "considered by our society to be
beyond all possible bounds of decency." '86 In Meroni the plaintiff's sus-
ceptibility and emotional disturbance did not change the court's finding
that the Church's conduct was not extreme and outrageous.38 7
The court in Molko held that the Unification Church's continued
deception and fraudulent induction of plaintiffs into a setting in which
they could be brainwashed could be construed as IIED.388 Such decep-
tion would be an abuse of a relation that gave the Church power to dam-
age plaintiffs' interests.
38 9
379. See supra notes 171-273 and accompanying text.
380. 46 Cal. 3d 1092, 762 P.2d 46, 252 Cal. Rptr. 122 (1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1084
(1989).
381. See supra notes 171-87 and accompanying text.
382. 644 P.2d 577 (Or. Ct. App.), petition denied, 650 P.2d 928 (Or. 1982), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1206 (1983).
383. Id. at 583 (quoting Turman v. Central Billing Bureau, 568 P.2d 1382, 1384 (Or.
1977)).
384. See supra notes 190-209 and accompanying text for a discussion of Christofferson, in
which the court held that although plaintiff was only 17 years old and several hundred miles
away from home for the first time, failure to plead "susceptibility to emotional distress" barred
recovery.
385. 506 N.Y.S.2d 174 (App. Div. 1986), appeal dismissed, 504 N.E.2d 698 (N.Y. 1987).
386. Id. at 177.
387. Id at 177-78.
388. Molko v. Holy Spirit Ass'n for Unification, 46 Cal. 3d 1092, 1122-23, 762 P.2d 46, 63,
252 Cal. Rptr. 122, 139 (1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1084 (1989).
389. Id
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Finally, in George v. International Society for Krishna Conscious-
ness,391 the court held that the Church's indoctrination practices did not
constitute outrageous conduct.3 9' In fact, the court found the indoctri-
nation methods not "uncommon [practices] among cloistered religious
groups. '392 Furthermore, the court stated that Robin George could not
have been forced to participate in these indoctrination practices, because
she was not threatened with physical force if she failed to comply.
39 3
Nor was she fraudulently induced to participate in these practices.394
The court also held that the Krishnas' conduct could not have been ex-
treme or outrageous 39' because the Krishnas lacked the requisite state of
mind. 96
In Molko 397 and in George 391 the plaintiffs charged that by being
brainwashed, they were in effect falsely imprisoned.399 In both cases,
however, the courts adhered to a requirement that there must be physical
force or a threat of physical force for the plaintiff to prevail.41 Threats
of divine retribution are constitutionally protected religious speech"'
that cannot be used to prove false imprisonment. °2 Low-carbohydrate
vegetarian diets, reduced amounts of sleep and endless chanting are all
constitutionally protected methods of religious conversion and practice
under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment .1 3 These prac-
tices are not sufficient to prove brainwashing or false imprisonment un-
less they are not required of all disciples and are particularly directed
towards the plaintiff.'
390. 262 Cal. Rptr. 217 (Ct. App. 1989) (depublished opinion), cert denied, 110 S. Ct. 2168
(1990), cert granted and vacated, 111 S. Ct. 1299 (1991).
391. Id. at 237.
392. Id. (footnote omitted).
393. Id, at 237 n.24.
394. Id. at 237.
395. Id.
396. Id. The court said there was no evidence showing intent or reckless disregard of the
possibility of causing Robin George emotional distress. Id.
397. 46 Cal. 3d 1092, 762 P.2d 46, 252 Cal. Rptr. 122 (1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1084
(1989).
398. 262 Cal. Rptr. 217 (Ct. App. 1989) (depublished opinion), cert denied, 110 S. Ct. 2168
(1990), cert granted and vacated, 111 S. Ct. 1299 (1991).
399. See supra notes 239-73 and accompanying text.
400. Molko, 46 Cal. 3d at 1123, 762 P.2d at 64, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 140; George, 262 Cal.
Rptr. at 236.
401. Molko, 46 Cal. 3d at 1123-24, 762 P.2d at 64, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 140; see also Fowler v.
Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67, 70 (1953) (holding religious sermon in park by Jehovah's witness to
be constitutionally protected).
402. Molko, 46 Cal. 3d at 1123-24, 762 P.2d at 64, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 140.
403. George, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 236.
404. Id.
January 1992]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAWREVIEW
Thus, what evidence will be accepted to prove brainwashing, what
element of the tort that brainwashing comprises, and what standard of
proof will be allowed varies not only with the tort, but also with the
jurisdiction or court.
3. Interests at stake under brainwashing
The interests sought to be protected in the brainwashing cases are
the victim's interest in freedom from coercive persuasion,"5 the victim's
interest in free will,4"6 and the victim's First Amendment right to volun-
tary religious choice.4°7 As the induction process can cause severe
psychological damage," 5 including psychotic breakdown, 409 emotional
distress4 0 and exacerbation of psychological problems, 411 the brain-
washing victim has a right to be free from a process that causes such
damage. Plaintiffs bring suit against religious sects under the rubric of
the torts of fraud,412 intentional infliction of emotional distress413 and
false imprisonment 414 because coercive persuasion is not recognized as
a tort.4 1 5 In fact, plaintiffs are praying for relief from being subjected to
the mind-numbing, will-paralyzing techniques of "religious
indoctrination.
416
Victims of brainwashing are similar to victims of undue influence
and involuntary servitude in that they are much more vulnerable, both
emotionally and mentally, than the stronger presence of the religious cult
and its leaders.41 7 Religious cults are interested in the free exercise and
establishment of their religion.418 The First Amendment protects these
interests as to religious beliefs and certain religiously motivated con-
405. Delgado, Religious Totalism, supra note 9, at 50-51.
406. Id.
407. See Shapiro, supra note 187, at 253-76 (right of mentation protected by First
Amendment).
408. See LANGONE & CLARK, supra note 23, at 95.
409. Id.
410. Delgado, Religious Totalism, supra note 9, at 10-15.
411. Id.
412. See supra notes 171-79 and accompanying text.
413. See supra notes 188-238 and accompanying text.
414. See supra notes 239-73 and accompanying text.
415. See supra notes 154-68 and accompanying text.
416. Delgado, Religious Totalism, supra note 9, at 15.
417. See supra notes 367-72 and accompanying text.
418. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Free Exercise Clause has been interpreted to protect reli-
gious beliefs absolutely. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940) ("[R]eligious
beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others in order to merit
First Amendment protection."); see Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981); see also
United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86-87 (1944) (inability to prove religious beliefs does not
make them suspect).
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duct.419 In fact, in many cases the First Amendment protection com-
pletely bars the brainwashed victim from suing the religious cult.420
Families who lose contact with the brainwashing victims as the in-
doctrination process isolates the victims are also affected. 421 Families
often bring suit for conservatorship,422 wrongful death423 and intentional
infliction of emotional distress.424
Finally, there is a societal interest in ascertaining that all adherents
to a controversial or non-controversial religious faith have consented to
join that faith of their own free will.425 The right to choose one's own
belief system is inherent in our protection of freedom of religion.426 If
through isolation,427 dietary428 and sleep deprivation,429 physical deple-
tion430 and propaganda,431 a religion can secure adherents who otherwise
would not have chosen to join that faith, in effect, the victim is deprived
of his or her freedom of religion.432
419. See supra notes 141-53 and accompanying text.
420. See, eg., Murphy v. I.S.K.CON., 571 N.E.2d 340, 348 (Mass.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
(1991); Meroni v. Holy Spirit Ass'n for Unification, 506 N.Y.S.2d 174, 177 (App. Div. 1986),
appeal dismissed, 504 N.E.2d 698 (N.Y. 1987).
421. See, eg., Molko v. Holy Spirit Ass'n for Unification, 46 Cal. 3d 1092, 1118, 762 P.2d
46, 60, 252 Cal. Rptr. 122, 136 (1988), cert denied, 490 U.S. 1084 (1989).
422. Katz v. Superior Court, 73 Cal. App. 3d 952, 956-58, 141 Cal. Rptr. 234, 235-36
(1977) (parents of Unification Church members brought action for conservatorship because
children brainwashed).
423. Meroni, 506 N.Y.S.2d at 175 (father sued for wrongful death of son who killed himself
within month after leaving religious cult).
424. George v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 262 Cal. Rptr. 217, 221 (Ct.
App. 1989) (depublished opinion) (mother sued for intentional infliction of emotional distress
when cult hid her fifteen-year-old daughter from her), cert denied, 110 S. Ct. 2168 (1990), cert.
granted and vacated, 111 S. Ct. 1299 (1991).
425. See LANGONE & CLARK, supra note 23, at 107. One commentator has asserted an-
other social cost of cult brainwashing: "Our nation is being robbed of our greatest resource:
bright, idealistic ambitious people who are capable of making an enormous contribution to
mankind." HASSAN, supra note 20, at 51. According to this author, "[E]ult members tend to
spend all their time either recruiting more people, fundraising or working on public relations
projects." Id. at 50. Thus, society would benefit if these cult members "were... set free to
develop their God-given talents and abilities." Id. at 52.
426. See Shapiro, supra note 187, at 253-76 (right of mentation protected by First
Amendment).
427. See LANGONE & CLARK, supra note 23, at 107.
428. Id.
429. Id.
430. Id.
431. Id.
432. See Shapiro, supra note 187, at 253-76.
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4. Effectiveness of current proof requirements in protecting interests
at stake in brainwashing by religious cults
The current proof requirements do not adequately protect the vic-
tim's interests,433 the affected families' interests434 nor society's inter-
ests431 in cult brainwashing cases. In stark contrast, the religious
organizations' interests appear to be adequately protected by the First
Amendment.436
The varying standards of proof4 37 give no clear guidance to courts,
plaintiffs, defendants or society as to what constitutes permissible and
impermissible brainwashing.438 By going to great pains to protect the
religious organizations' First Amendment rights,439 courts lose sight of
one important fact: these organizations are seeking emotionally vulnera-
ble people"' to exploit for their own purposes.441 The irony is that in
undue influence cases courts recognize that a donor of property may be
vulnerable to the influence of the donee' 2 and presume undue influ-
ence." 3 In brainwashing cases, however, where a person's mind or
mental health is at stake, the courts do little to protect vulnerable
victims.
Furthermore, by requiring plaintiffs to couch their claims for coer-
cive persuasion in traditional tort forms, such as fraud 4 " or intentional
infliction of emotional distress (which also has varying standards in dif-
ferent jurisdictions)," 5 courts increase the plaintiffs' burdens and further
433. See LANGONE & CLARK, supra note 23, at 107.
434. Id.
435. Id.
436. See supra notes 141-53 and accompanying text for a discussion of First Amendment
protections.
437. See supra notes 378-404 and accompanying text.
438. See supra notes 378-404 and accompanying text.
439. See supra notes 141-53 and accompanying text.
440. See ENROTH & MELTON, supra note 372, at 60.
441. "[Mjembership in extremist cults literally entails nonstop activities such as fund-rais-
ing, witnessing, chanting, indoctrination and forced labor." ENROTH, supra note 20, at 166.
442. See Patrinelis, supra note 65, at 653.
443. See, e.g., Gilmore v. Lee, 86 N.E. 568, 570 (Ill. 1908).
444. See Molko v. Holy Spirit Ass'n for Unification, 46 Cal. 3d 1092, 1102-03, 762 P.2d 46,
49, 252 Cal. Rptr. 122, 125 (1988), cert denied, 490 U.S. 1084 (1989), for a discussion of
brainwashed plaintiffs' tort claims.
445. For example, in George v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, the court
focused on the Krishnas' state of mind in indoctrinating Robin George. 262 Cal. Rptr. 217,
237 (Ct. App. 1989) (depublished opinion), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2168 (1990), cert. granted
and vacated, 111 S. Ct. 1299 (1991). The court did not address the outrageous conduct claim,
the "abuse of a relation or power giving it the power to damage plaintiffs' interest," which
survived summary judgment in Molko. Molko, 46 Cal. 3d at 1122-23, 762 P.2d at 63, 252 Cal.
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protect the religious organizations where the facts of conversion do not
fit the neatly proscribed limits of these torts.
The reasons for the courts' refusal to recognize brainwashing as a
tort are also unclear. As with intentional infliction of emotional distress,
there are psychological and physical damages that can occur as a result
of coercive persuasion. 4 " By requiring brainwashing victims to show
fraud or physical duress, courts confuse the distinction between L-TCP
and short-term physical duress.' 7 In effect, courts claim that there is no
L-TCP without short-term physical duress. Yet these two forms of per-
suasion are directly opposite each other.
Furthermore, courts may be erroneously comparing religious cult
brainwashing to the other contexts for brainwashing-prisoners-of-
war" and criminal defendants.' 9 In these contexts, where defendants
are asserting brainwashing as a defense to being charged with violent
culpable behavior (either collaborating with the enemy or criminal con-
duct), requiring physical duress makes sense. Because prisoners-of-war
who betray their country4"' or criminal defendants who rob or kill people
are deviating far from acceptable societal norms of conduct, there must
be a compelling reason to explain these defendants' acts.451 Threats of
physical violence or death may be sufficient to overcome the defendant's
will.
4 5 2
In contrast, young people as a rule are not taught to hate or fight
religious cult influences.453 In fact, as evinced by the First Amendment,
in this country we accept, if not encourage, various belief systems.454
When someone is emotionally disturbed or in a difficult stage of growth,
Rptr. at 139 (quoting Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Protection Dist., 43 Cal. 3d 148, 155 n.7, 729
P.2d 743, 747 n.7, 233 Cal. Rptr. 308, 312 n.7 (1987)).
446. See LANGONE & CLARK, supra note 23, at 94-96.
447. See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text for a discussion of the differences be-
tween L-TCP and short-term physical duress.
448. See United States v. Olson, 20 C.M.R. 461, 462 (1955); United States v. Batchelor, 19
C.M.R. 452, 464 (1955); United States v. Fleming, 19 C.M.R. 438, 440 (1955).
449. See United States v. Hearst, 412 F. Supp. 889 (N.D. Cal. 1976); see also BuGLiosI &
GENTRY, supra note 22, at 310-455 (attempting to introduce evidence of Charles Manson's
influence or brainwashing to mitigate sentencing for murder).
450. American soldiers during the Korean conflict, prior to being captured and brain-
washed, were taught to hate and fight their Korean captors. In order to overcome this innate
prejudice, therefore, the Korean captors would have to resort to violence or the threat thereof.
See Donald T. Lunde & Thomas E. Wilson, Brainwashing as a Defense to Criminal Liability:
Patty Hearst Revisited, 13 CRIM. L. BuLL. 341, 344-55 (1977).
451. LAFAvE & ScoTr, supra note 16, § 5.3, at 434.
452. Id. § 5.3, at 436 & nn.28-29.
453. See generally ENROTH & MELTON, supra note 372, at 47-77 (discussing appeal of cults
to adolescents).
454. The First Amendment to the United States Constitution states that "Congress shall
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it is not uncommon to seek answers.4 55 Religious groups that claim to
have the answers to these questions may be naturally attractive.45 6 Thus,
a religious group is likely to have no need to resort to violence in its
indoctrination program. The techniques of isolation from outside influ-
ences,457 dietary and sleep deprivation,45  physical depletion 459 and
group propaganda 46 are sufficient to overcome whatever resistance to
conversion there may be, especially if the convert enters the process in an
already emotionally vulnerable state.
V. A MODEL FOR A UNIFIED BALANCING APPROACH FOR L-TCP
The similarities between undue influence, involuntary servitude and
brainwashing should be recognized as examples of L-TCP.461 Therefore,
legal tests should protect the interests underlying L-TCP.
Furthermore, undue influence, involuntary servitude and brain-
washing by religious cults cases, at their cores, protect the freedom of
will interests of the victims. Current laws, however, have failed to render
a unified approach towards L-TCP. While permitting a centuries-old
model of psychological influence in undue influence,462 courts nonethe-
less fail to apply this standard in involuntary servitude and religious cult
brainwashing cases." 3 This results in the inconsistent rule that if some-
one uses psychological influence to deprive a person of free choice in
disposing of property, the donor or his or her heirs can recover the prop-
erty and revoke the gift."4 Yet, if someone deprives a person of the free-
dom to work"5 or freedom to choose religious beliefs through coercive
methods," 6 they must use violence to do so, or the victim cannot re-
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof."
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
455. See ENROTH & MELTON, supra note 372, at 60.
456. Id.
457. Delgado, Religious Totalism, supra note 9, at 50-51.
458. Id
459. Id.
460. Id.
461. See supra note 17 and accompanying text for a definition of L-TCP.
462. See, eg., Norton v. Relly, 2 Eden 286, 28 Eng. Rep. 908 (1764).
463. See supra notes 96-274 and accompanying text.
464. See, eg., The Bible Speaks v. Dovydenas, 81 B.R. 750, 752-53 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1988)
(donor sought return of monetary gifts), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 869 F.2d 628 (Bankr. 1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 816 (1989); Gilmore v. Lee, 86 N.E. 568, 569 (Ill. 1908) (daughter
successful in revoking gift to priest by her dying mother); McClellan v. Grant, 82 N.Y.S. 208,
209 (App. Div. 1903) (son brought suit to revoke deed from mother to pastor).
465. United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 952 (1988).
466. See Meroni v. Holy Spirit Ass'n for Unification, 506 N.Y.S.2d 174, 177-78 (App. Div.
1986), appeal dismissed, 504 N.E.2d 698 (N.Y. 1987).
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cover. Are our property interests more sacred than our freedom of liveli-
hood or freedom to believe?
The tests for undue influence in the context of inter vivos gifts to
clergy should be modified and applied to involuntary servitude and
brainwashing cases, giving a much needed unified approach to L-TCP
analysis.
A. Test for Involuntary Servitude
The susceptibility model in undue influence 7 should be modified
and applied to the crime of involuntary servitude. First, there must be an
enslaved person working for the defendant for little or no money, with no
alternative. Second, if the enslaved person is susceptible to overriding
influences due to age, mental disability, mental weakness or religious fa-
naticism, the court should apply an "overmastering" effect test."
Under the "overmastering" effect test, the trier of fact asks whether the
defendant exerted improper influence over the victim and whether the
victim was overcome by the "overmastering" effect. Third, if the victim
was of sound mind and body, the court should apply the test in United
States v. Kozminski:" 9 whether the defendant physically or legally
threatened the victim.470
This three-part test for involuntary servitude first focuses on the vic-
tim's enslavement and susceptibility, and then addresses the defendant's
actions. Furthermore, this test protects each party's interests better than
the Kozminski physical or legal threat standard.
When a victim is more susceptible to involuntary servitude, the
proof requirements should be reduced. Under this lower standard, the
test is whether the defendant exerted improper influence and whether the
victim succumbed to the influence. The prosecution need not show phys-
ical duress. Thus, as in undue influence, the susceptible victim receives
more protection than the non-susceptible victim.
If the victim is able-bodied or able-minded, or if there is other evi-
dence showing that the victim was unlikely to succumb to involuntary
servitude without violent or legal force, evidence of violent or legal force
should be required. Thus, a less susceptible victim would receive less
protection than a more susceptible victim; if less legal protection is
needed, less is given. The defendant in an involuntary servitude prosecu-
467. See supra notes 92-95 and accompanying text.
468. Similarly if the enslaved person is rendered susceptible by defendant's treatment, the
court should apply an "overmastering" effect test.
469. 487 U.S. 931 (1988).
470. Id.
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tion would also benefit from this two-pronged test. When the victim is
less vulnerable, it is harder to convict the defendant because the stan-
dards are higher.
Society benefits under this model because the lower standard of
proof for more susceptible victims (1) makes it easier to prosecute those
defendants who most egregiously violate our anti-slavery laws, (2) oper-
ates as a deterrent for defendants imposing servitude on the most vulner-
able victims, and most importantly, (3) more effectively protects the
weaker members of society. By strengthening the requirement for
stronger victims, this approach would also balance the interests of the
criminal defendant, who faces possible imprisonment for his or her
crime, and the victim, who is still protected at law. The interests at stake
in involuntary servitude cases are thus effectively addressed by this three-
part test.
B. Test for Brainwashing by Religious Cults
Brainwashing by religious cults should be addressed directly by the
tort laws. In order to protect the interests at stake, courts should allow a
tort of coercive influence. Direct access to civil redress is the only way to
effectively and consistently protect these interests. Requiring brain-
washing victims to pigeonhole their causes of action into existent torts
causes inconsistent results and confusion for both the courts and the par-
ties.4 71 Although there are religious First Amendment problems with
any state action against a religious group,4 72 there is also another impor-
tant free exercise right at stake-the right to freely choose one's own
belief system. When one is subjected to coercive persuasion prior to join-
ing a religious group, one has not freely chosen that belief system. 473 The
proposed test for brainwashing or coercive persuasion therefore ad-
dresses the First Amendment concerns of both the victim and the reli-
gious group as well as the societal interests at stake.474
The proposed test for brainwashing, like the proposed test for invol-
untary servitude, is adapted from the proof requirements for undue influ-
ence. Under the presumption model, undue influence may be inferred
from the mere existence of a confidential relationship47 5 between a pa-
471. See supra notes 379-404 and accompanying text for varying standards of proof in
brainwashing cases.
472. See supra notes 141-53 and accompanying text.
473. See, Delgado, Religious Totalism, supra note 9, at 4.
474. See supra notes 405-32 and accompanying text for a discussion of the societal interests
at stake in cult brainwashing cases.
475. Although a confidential and trusting relationship is said to exist between a spiritual
leader and a spiritual follower, the reason for the presumption of undue influence is not that
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rishioner and cleric, or between a spiritual adviser and an adherent to
that spiritual doctrine.47 6 This inference can make out a prima facie case
of undue influence and place the burden of disproving undue influence on
the donee.4 7
A presumption of brainwashing would arise whenever a group
(religious or otherwise) had a system of indoctrination that included iso-
lation, drastic dietary modifications, drastic sleep deprivation, extraordi-
narily long working hours, taxing physical activity or incessant
propaganda with little or no time for reflection or individual thought
prior to membership. This presumption would be strengthened whenever
the victim displayed signs of brainwashing such as loss of will, or the
inability to respond to simple questions without reciting the cult's jargon
or propaganda. When the victim, due to age, mental condition, life cri-
sis, illness or mental disability was more vulnerable to the group's influ-
ence, the presumption would also be strengthened. Active pursuit of new
converts to the group, particularly "easy targets"-those individuals
most susceptible-would also strengthen the presumption of
brainwashing.
In fact, before the indoctrinee submits to this process, there should
be a duty for the religious group to seek the indoctrinee's informed con-
sent after disclosing the group's practices to the indoctrinee.478 Evidence
of the religious group's compliance with this duty could be shown in two
ways: (1) if the indoctrinee obtained adequate, independent advice prior
to commencing indoctrination,479 or (2) if the indoctrinee was entitled to
a seven-day waiting period between the time he or she was first ap-
proached by the group and the time he or she started the indoctrination
process. During the waiting period, the indoctrinee should be entirely
free from any influence by the religious group. Evidence of the indoc-
trinee's effective consent by one of the above methods, or of a predisposi-
tion to join this group would weaken the presumption of brainwashing.
In sum, there should be a presumption of brainwashing whenever an
indoctrination process employs coercive methods. This presumption
would be strengthened by (1) the religious follower's vulnerability (age,
mental condition, life crisis, illness or mental disability), (2) active pur-
the donee is a spiritual leader. Instead, the spiritual leader may have a fiduciary relation with
the follower "which, if used for the benefit of the donee, will result in exercise of an influence
not possessed by the ordinary person, and sufficient, according to the ordinary experience of
mankind, to overcome the will of the donor." Patrinelis, supra note 65, at 657.
476. Id. at 657-60 (fiduciary relation exists between the parties).
477. See supra notes 64-83 and accompanying text.
478. Delgado, Religious Totalism, supra note 9, at 61-62.
479. Id.
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suit of new converts, particularly "easy targets," and (3) the spiritual
group's breach of its duty to get the victim's informed consent. The spir-
itual group could weaken this presumption by showing that (1) the spiri-
tual group obtained the follower's informed consent or (2) the follower
had a preexisting intent to join the group before submission to the indoc-
trination process.
This test more effectively protects the rights involved in brain-
washing cases than the current methods. The victim receives more pro-
tection, because there is a separate tort of brainwashing that will allow
recovery if the victim was subjected to this process without his or her
consent. The informed consent requirement, by giving the victim the
benefit of independent advice or a waiting period before submitting to
indoctrination, guarantees that the decision to join or not join the reli-
gious group wrn be the convert's-not the result of coercive persuasion.
In this way, the informed consent requirement protects the religious fol-
lower's First Amendment rights. Both the presumption of brainwashing
when coercive practices are used prior to joining the group, and the
strengthening of the presumption when the victim is more vulnerable or
when the religious group is more aggressive in its pursuit of converts,
further protect the victim from the potentially overpowering influence of
the spiritual group.
Weakening the presumption when the religious group has complied
with the consent requirement, or when the convert has a preexisting in-
tent to join the group, protects the religious group as well. If the group
complies with certain consent requirements, the risks of a lawsuit by an
unhappy convert would be reduced in two ways. First, there would be
less unhappy converts when the religious group painstakingly ascertains
that its convert has freely decided to join the group. Second, even if a
lawsuit were brought, evidence of the convert's informed consent to join
the group, absent other tortious conduct, would weaken the presumption
of brainwashing and therefore strengthen the group's case.
Nor does this proposed test for brainwashing pose any First Amend-
ment problems for religious groups. First, the test addresses conduct, not
religious belief.480 Under Employment Division, Department of Human
Resources v. Smith,4"' religious conduct that is incidentally regulated by
a law against coercive practices likely will not even be subject to the
480. See supra notes 141-44 and accompanying text for a discussion of the First Amend-
ment's absolute protection of religious beliefs, as contrasted with the qualified constitutional
protection of religiously motivated conduct.
481. 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990).
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traditional compelling state interest test.482 However, even if Smith ulti-
mately is held not to apply to civil regulations,483 and the indoctrination
process is construed as religiously, and not secularly, motivated con-
duct,484 there are nonetheless pressing societal interests. For example,
the convert's free exercise rights485 and society's interest in protecting
converts from coercive persuasion are important countervailing inter-
ests.486  These governmental interests outweigh the minimal restric-
tions487 that consent requirements and suits for brainwashing would
impose upon religious groups.
No less burdensome alternative could effectively satisfy the govern-
ment's interests in protecting a cult victim's freedom of religion or soci-
ety's interest in protection from brainwashing.488 Certainly, the current
practice of suing religious groups through tort causes of action such as
fraud, intentional infliction of emotional distress and false imprisonment
does not adequately protect these interests.
This test for brainwashing has the purpose and effect of advancing
the government's secular goals.4 89 It does not discriminate among reli-
gions,490 or between religion and non-religion.49 1 Thus, tort liability for
brainwashing does not violate a religious group's First Amendment
rights.
The proposed test for brainwashing should protect the victim's fam-
ily's interests as well.4 2 By placing a consent requirement on groups
engaging in coercive practices, the family may have the opportunity to
intervene before the victim is isolated from the family and submits to the
indoctrination process. Even if the convert chooses to submit to the in-
doctrination process after either receiving independent advice or a week's
482. See id. at 1603; see also supra note 147 and accompanying text.
483. See supra note 147 which discusses the implication that it will be applied in civil cases.
484. See supra notes 145-50 and accompanying text for the traditional First Amendment
analysis which does not protect secular conduct, but offers qualified protection to religiously
motivated conduct.
485. See Shapiro, supra note 187, at 253-76.
486. See id.
487. See supra notes 147-48 and accompanying text for a description of the compelling
state interest test used in traditional First Amendment analysis.
488. See supra note 149 and accompanying text for an explanation of how the First Amend-
ment requires that the regulation burdening religiously motivated conduct be the least restric-
tive alternative.
489. See supra note 150 and accompanying text for a description of this requirement under
traditional First Amendment analysis.
490. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
491. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
492. See supra notes 421-24 and accompanying text for a discussion of the family's interests
in brainwashing cases.
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reflection period, at least the family will know that it was the convert's
decision to submit to the process.
Finally, this proposed test for brainwashing addresses the societal
issues arising in religious coercive persuasion cases.493 The test ade-
quately protects the indoctrinee's freedom of religion and freedom of will
interests, as well as his or her family's interests. Nor is protecting the
convert's interests done at the expense of the religious groups, because
the proposed test does not violate the groups' First Amendment rights.
Therefore, societal interests are well protected by this proposed test for
brainwashing.
VI. CONCLUSION
Not all forms of coercive persuasion are harmful. In fact, certain
methods of persuasion may offer benefits to the coerced individual or to
society. There are, however, harmful forms of coercive persuasion. A
person in a confidential relationship can use undue influence to obtain a
gift or valuable property from the other party. A person with a stronger
personality can subject another with a more vulnerable personality to
involuntary servitude, with or without threats of violence or legal action.
Cults can use brainwashing to indoctrinate followers before they can rea-
sonably consent to joining the group.
These forms of long-term coercive persuasion should be treated sim-
ilarly, because although the oppression may take different forms, they all
deprive the victim of his or her exercise of free will. As a result, allowing
even one individual to be deprived of freedom of choice in this manner
debases everyone's freedom of choice.
Ann Penners Wrosch*
493. See supra notes 425-32 and accompanying text for a discussion of the societal interests
at stake in brainwashing cases.
* B.A., Pomona College, 1982. This Comment is dedicated to Paul and to my parents
John and Jacqueline Penners as thanks for all their love and support.
[Vol. 25:499
